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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
RE-THINKING PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PHENOMENOLOGY AND
THE GEOPOLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE IN LATIN AMERICAN-U.S. RELATIONS
by
Mauro J. Caraccioli
Florida International University, 2009
Miami, Florida
Professor Frangois Debrix, Major Professor
What constitutes the meaning of a place? In what ways does place affect our ways
of thought? This study seeks to explore the geopolitical relationship between place and
the study of International Relations (IR). By re-conceptualizing the category of place as a
situated and geo-historical marker of human identity, new spaces of inclusion and
collaboration in Latin American-U.S. relations can be uncovered, linking the study of
phenomenology to contemporary IR theories. With attention on the lived-experience and
existential nature of geopolitics behind Latin American-U.S. Cold War relations, the
study of geopolitics can be de-colonized from the monopoly of dominant centers of
knowledge, displacing the historical exclusion of responses and alternatives from the
marginalized developing world. The displacement of these imperial forms of thought thus
gives rise to a critical pedagogy of international relations as a practice constituting
everyday life, re-thinking the history of the discipline in order to broaden its horizons.
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Chapter I: Introduction: Geopolitics, Phenomenology and International Relations
The motivation for the present study lies in the ambiguous relationship between
place and thought. More specifically, it is concerned with how the study of the
international relations between Latin America and the United States is influenced by the
phenomenon of the geopolitics of knowledge, and how its origins can be found in the
ambiguity between place and forms of thought. Its objective lies in demonstrating how
the geopolitical nature of knowledge, as a fundamentally global and historical
phenomenon, conditions theories about international relations (as a practice and
discipline) to reflect perspectives that (even in strands of critical thought) often exclude
the experience of thinkers and ways of thought emerging from the developing nations. As
an act of exclusion, geopolitics accomplishes the insulation of International Relations
(IR) theory and thus acts a fundamental hindrance to the resolution of some of our most
pressing contemporary international problems (i.e., poverty, war, imperialism, terrorism,
etc.). Most of these problems are at the center of how the developed world understands
and relates to developing states, and yet in the process of theorizing about them shuns
their experiences, contributions and modes of understanding. The present study seeks to
overcome this exclusion by adopting a phenomenological understanding of the lived-
experience of the geopolitics of knowledge from a pedagogical perspective.
Like theory and thought in general, the geopolitics of knowledge is a phenomenon
constructed vis-i-vis conceptions of space and place, and their power to determine and
subvert the identity of human beings and thought. Place is key in both the process of
knowing the world and ultimately of knowing oneself. To understand how we know
ourselves, and thus understand how we know others and our interaction with them in-the-
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world, it is crucial to understand the geographical and situated basis of knowledge and
human existence. In this context, place determines thought by coloring and texturing how
we attend to it (by naming it as familiar or foreign) and how it attends to us (as a home, a
place of learning, or a place of fear or hate). As a situated and existentially rooted
phenomenon, the place of thought not only determines its nature or quality, but also
determines its use, ends and objectives. It is no new philosophical contribution to argue
that thought and knowledge (with their political implications) are ultimately about power
and the struggle for power.' As a political phenomenon, not only does thought function in
the interests of those who wield it, but it also determines the very way those who are
oppressed by it come to know themselves. The colonization of the Americas, for instance,
has been historically presented as a "civilizing" endeavor that brought Christianity to a
"New World," rather than the invasion and conquest of an established indigenous
civilization, alien and other to an embryonic European modernity.2
The relationship between knowing and thinking about place as an instance of
power and self-understanding is crucial to what I seek to expose and analyze here;
namely, if knowledge is conditioned by place, and in fact constantly seeks to give new
meanings to places, then thought is in-and-of-itself a geopolitical phenomenon. By
geopolitical, I mean both a phenomenon that gives political meaning to places and is
historically conditioned by the nature and texture of the places it emerges from and acts
For two influential examples, see: Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1982), pp. 208-27; see also: Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International
Relations," in International Organization, (No. 59, Winter 2005), pp. 39-75.
2 See Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "The Other" and the Myth of
Modernity (New York: Continuum, 1995) and Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The
Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row, 1984)
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upon. As a political extension of situated forms of knowledge, the geopolitical
implications of thought thus make the interaction between places (as politicized spaces)
not only a matter of the behavior of actors across geographical terrains, boundaries and
borders, but also a matter of how their behavior is conditioned by ideas and thoughts:
ideologies, histories, and ways of knowing that act as fundamental traces of broader
geopolitical designs. To speak of a geopolitics of knowledge, therefore, is to radically
approach the interaction of ideas and forms of knowledge across geographical places, as
well as the political uses and implications for imperialism and marginalization that these
interactions entail. 3
International Relations and the Geopolitics of Knowledge
The traditional understanding of the study of geopolitics, and what makes it
attractive, has soundly rested on its alleged ability to provide a comprehensive
understanding of complex events, and as Gear6id O Tuathail suggests, "[reducing] the
complexity of world politics to a simplified framework" of spatial abstractions and
metaphors about the way world politics is structured.4 Aspiring to be a form of "prophetic
discourse," geopolitics seeks to provide a clear framework of political thought in what is
an otherwise foggy and blurry international arenas; it provides a clear script of what is
good and bad in the world (such as "rogue" or "evil" states), bringing all these factors
3 In the context of Latin America-U.S. relations, my use of imperialism and marginalization refers
to how these relations are popularly represented and understood: 1) from a position of near
absolute economic and political dominance (imperialism) by the U.S., and 2) from a position of
little to no intellectual inclusion of the positions and perspectives of Latin American thinkers,
groups and states (marginalization) that differ from agendas within the U.S.
a Gear6id O Tuathail, "Thinking Critically About Geopolitics," in Gear6id O Tuathail, Simon
Dalby, and Paul Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 2
5 O Tuathail, "Thinking Critically About Geopolitics," p. 2.
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back to an ultimately personal and existential dimension by linking them to our
contingent understanding of survival and well-being (translated politically as the security
of the nation, the state or even an empire). 6 International Relations thought in the North-
Atlantic has traditionally embraced this conception of geopolitics and has divided its
academic structures into sub-disciplines that reflect these conceptions, particularly in the
fields of area studies and strategic studies.7
Geopolitics is the study of how spaces, places and their identity are politically
endowed and used for the purposes of power; it is essentially about the writing of space,
and how this ties places to meanings and identities amenable to the interests of dominant
groups and entities.8 The writing of space, as an extension of the human capacity to dwell
in places and endow them with personal meaning, has profound existential implications
for the way we live, but most importantly for the way we think. Geopolitics is a way of
constructing and structuring the world and how we understand it. By claiming to act in
the name of security, nationalism, humanitarian intervention, or any other kind of
ideology - that is to say, by constructing ways of thinking about national and
international issues - the agents of geopolitical actions seek to write a script suitable to
their interests and ways of thinking. In the history of the Americas, some of these scripts
6 See: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000)
7 Though there is an immense amount of literature that supports these black and white
preconceptions, see the by now classic writings of Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) and Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering
the Dreams of the Post-Cold War, (New York: Random House, 2000); pertaining to the
geopolitics of Latin American-U.S. relations, see Jorge G. Castaeda, Utopia Unarmed: The
Latin American Left After the Cold War (New York: Knopf, 1993)
8 Gear6id 6 Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 7.
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have ranged from evangelization, democracy, revolution and neoliberal globalization -
the underside of which has produced colonialism, plutocracy, dictatorship and
exploitation. In the process of spreading what have been otherwise attractive ideas, what
these geopolitical constructs have thus entailed is the obstruction and eclipsing of the
ideas and thoughts of those on their receiving end.9
Ideas have the power to shape the interests and modes of thinking of those
oppressed by them through geographically based mechanisms of exclusion and
domination.' 0 These mechanisms work at different levels ranging from state conceptions
of the economic and political (for example, domestic organisms that regulate spending
and consuming behavior, along with international organizations that monitor national
policies) to personal constructions of the intellectual and the cultural (such as the
adoption by intellectuals and institutions from Latin America and the global South of
concerns and perspectives, like modernization theories and neo-liberal economics, born
out of North-Atlantic circles). For the purposes of this study, the present lack of
dialogical and collaborative interaction between Northern and Southern perspectives in
the study and practice of Latin American-U.S. relations is a phenomenon that is rooted
and historically conditioned by the coextensive phenomenon of modernity and of colonial
history. The relationship between these two moments is crucial to the way the West has
imposed its vision of world history upon academic disciplines and the study of
international relations, but is also the defining characteristic of the geopolitics of
9 See: Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas, pp. 18-26
10 Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and
Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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knowledge." What interests us here, however, is how this broad phenomenon of the
geopolitics of knowledge plays itself out in the Cold War context of Latin American-U.S.
relations, and how does re-thinking the experience of place acts as the first step in
overcoming the epistemic exclusions of global geopolitical designs?
Geo-Phenomenology: New Considerations For A Critical Geopolitics
The geopolitics of knowledge is a phenomenon largely determined by conceptions
of space, place and their ability to condition and subvert identities. These conceptions are
born out of the personal and lived-experience of individuals and the geo-historical
circumstances in which they occur. They are thus epistemic constructions: of ourselves,
of others, and of the world we live in. Even when we claim to approach a problem from
an objective perspective, or at least seek to de-center modern subjectivity in terms of our
approach,' 2 we are ultimately doing this from a situated (and thus personal) experience of
this problem.' 3 That is to say, though primacy for the all-knowing subject of modernity
may be necessarily suspended, the presence of a human self that is the source of thinking
is never fully vanquished. In order to thus address the nature of geopolitical knowledge
adequately, a method is needed that will approach the geopolitics of knowledge from its
" See Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America," International
Sociology, (vol. 15, no. 2, 2000) pp. 215-232; see also: Mignolo, Local Histories / Global
Designs, pp. 17-18 and Dussel, The Invention of the Americas, pp. 27-36
12 Contemporary IR thought has taken particular interest in strands of French philosophy
characterized by the criticism and reaction against modernity's worst epistemological excesses.
Too numerous to illustrate here, for recent examples see: David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro
(eds.) Moral Spaces: Re-thinking Ethics and World Politics, (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1999), and David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), The Political Subject of
Violence, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993)
13 Edward Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy: What Does It Mean to Be in the Place-
World?," in Annals of the Association of American Geographers (Vol. 91, No. 4, 2001), pp. 683-
693.
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own level and on its own terms, that is to say, an approach that parts from the situated
nature of how we know the world and how it affects us. The method we seek must first
clarify the condition of possibility that makes the geopolitics of knowledge a
phenomenon of subjective constructions, and take this condition as its point of departure
for a critical, unprejudiced understanding of both the problem and the world it finds itself
situated in - the work of phenomenology emerges from this attempt at clarification.
Phenomenology is concerned with the relationship between human consciousness
and the world around us. It seeks to interpret phenomena present before us in a pre-
reflective manner, that is to say, in ways that try to understand their occurrence as when
we first experience them, before any kind of judgments. As the French philosopher
Maurice Merleau-Ponty contends:
Phenomenology is...a philosophy which puts essences back into existence, and
does not expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any
starting point other than that of their 'facticity'. It tries to give a direct description
of our experience as it is, without taking into account its psychological origin and
causal explanation which the scientist, the historian or the sociologist may be
able to provide.14
Phenomenology thus seeks to understand the way our knowledge comes about as part of
our being-in-the-world,5  re-thinking the personal prejudices and embodied
circumstances that it emerges from and carries with it. Phenomenology is an open-ended
method that transcends the Cartesian entrapment of human thought ("I think, therefore I
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1962), p. vii
15 As Eric Matthews contends, Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on perception and of existence as
being-in-the-world (following Martin Heidegger) makes it clear that "consciousness or
subjectivity is distinct from objects and essentially related to them," making our subjective (and
existential) relationship to the world possible only through our bodies. See: Eric Matthews,
Twentieth Century French Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 92.
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am.") and re-situates its content to the human quality of lived-experience ("I am part of
the world, and the world is part of me.").
Phenomenology parts from the experience of the world by the embodied subject,
but aims at deepening and broadening this experience by understanding how the subject
knows and interacts with the other's experience and interpretation of the world: it is
inherently intersubjective.16 As Merleau-Ponty reminds us, by starting from our place of
knowledge and overcoming its limits in the movement towards the place of the subject
we are engaging with, phenomenology allows us to "[learn] to see what is ours as alien
and what was alien as ours."' 7 Through this process of going beyond ourselves, we not
only understand our own situation in the world in a more rigorous way, but in this
process of transcending, in looking at the other's experience and understanding of the
world as both the motivation and the focus of that which we study, we weave a tapestry
of meaning and communication that lays the ground for future critical dialogue and
collaboration.
Though phenomenology is itself an originally Western project, it is open-ended in
its invitation to see the world as a human (not a male/female, developed/underdeveloped,
Northern/Southern) enterprise and field of discovery for our mutual development and
understanding - an invitation that has been embraced by the broad range of thinkers from
the global North and South that I will be engaging with here. Phenomenology goes
beyond the mirror of thought (the Cartesian legacy of taking the individual subject as the
16 See: Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 154-199, 346-365, 434-456; Alfred
Schutz, Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967),
and Nick Crossley, The Politics of Subjectivity: Between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1994).
17 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 120.
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sole arbiter of reality) in order to center on lived-experience as the foundation of human
thinking, a conception that is rooted in the intricate relationship between place,
perception and history.'8 Since the problem of the geopolitics of knowledge is one that is
specifically concerned with this relationship, phenomenology is an appropriate method to
question the nature of this problem and also an appropriate vehicle to present this
problem to North-Atlantic academics and audiences. As I will argue below, the project of
a geo-phenomenology is intimately tied with the further development of a critical
geopolitics: the attempt to question and re-think the place-bound attempts at intellectual
dominance (through representational discourses) by established centers of power.19 A
phenomenological understanding of place, the state, economic modernization and the
ways these are taught and developed in university classrooms would not only provide an
access to the political motivations of geopolitical actors, but more importantly contributes
a key displacement of the rationalist delusions of grandeur behind most theories of IR,
establishing a connection with critical geopolitics literature that broadens its focus and
strengthens its critique.
Phenomenology builds upon a history familiar to academic thinkers (Western
philosophy), but moves towards a history that is unknown to them and beyond. By re-
thinking the place of human consciousness in relation to the world as situated in the
individual, and thus bringing geopolitical discussions and constructions back to the
18 See John O'Neill, Perception, Expression and History: The Social Phenomenology of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
19 As O Tuathail points out, critical attempts at the study of geopolitics are inscriptions onto the
identity of geopolitical discourses, standing out as "significant moments in the writing of a truth
around 'geopolitics'... important occasions for exploring how the concept of geopolitics is formed
and how it functions." See: O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 142. A re-thinking of the place of
these same critical attempts is thus more than implied.
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people that geopolitics directly affects (positively and negatively), phenomenology is a
radical understanding that takes geopolitics as a phenomenon of history and thus
everyday life. A radicalized phenomenology (that is to say, a phenomenology that
focuses on that which makes us human: lived-experience) can take us beyond the mirror
of thought and ourselves towards the thought of others, making the study of international
relations a more international (and transnational) endeavor.
Blueprint For The Study
My project seeks to understand the place and influence of ways of thinking about
Latin American-U.S. relations, and how the understanding of this place affects the way
we make sense of the economic, social, and political events and implications that emerge
from it. These phenomena are often largely determinant not only of how we approach the
thought of intellectuals from other parts of the world, but also of how their thought - as
reflective of their own lived-experience of particular international situations - is given or
denied political meaning and agency. The essence of what we can call a geopolitics of
knowledge thus consists of the geographic basis and use of forms of knowledge in order
to eclipse difference and establish policies and practices of exclusion and domination.
The focus of this project will be to analyze how the geopolitics of knowledge
takes place and develops in the study of Latin American-U.S. relations as a historical
phenomenon that is reflective of practices of imperialism and resistance, and as part of
the worldwide phenomenon of North-South relations. The primary task will be to analyze
four main issues: 1) the phenomenological understanding of the geopolitical nature of
thought and how it is discerned in contemporary critical philosophies; 2) the nature and
evolution of the human experience of place as a precursor to modern narratives of
10
national identity and international security; 3) the displacement of an epistemic
imperialism through a study of Cold War modernization theories in Latin America; and
4) the movement to a position that seeks to build dialogues across disciplines, borders
and the boundaries of space, place and thought.
Given the massive historical, sociological and ultimately philosophical nature of
this project, the contribution to a deeper understanding of its content is only partial, at
least as it concerns its relative size and weight. The analysis of the problems found in the
above factors seeks to contribute to contemporary study and debate by re-thinking the
concerns over space, place and the identity of thinkers and forms of thought. The present
approach (phenomenological, hermeneutic) will differ from the approach used by
scholars of critical geopolitics (post-structural, deconstructive) by appealing to the
fundamental place phenomenology holds as part of the development and history of
Western thought, that is to say, by appealing to the human qualities that a
phenomenological understanding sees as making all thought possible. The following
critique is not made in the spirit of discrediting the validity of the approaches and
contributions of critical geopolitics literature, but rather in the spirit of allowing them to
listen to the approaches, contributions and experience of thinkers from the other side of a
colonial difference between North and South. A second contribution is thus sought here
in the form of a philosophical de-colonization of critical geopolitics approaches and a
broadening of intellectual horizons in IR theory and contemporary philosophy.
The physiognomy of this study should therefore reveal an attempt that seeks to
open the doors of IR thought to studies of both its kind (as critically reflective and
interdisciplinary) and commitment (as inclusive and dialogical). The work will be
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developed across four chapters: Chapter One will sketch out a phenomenological
understanding of the geopolitical nature of thought and how this makes geopolitics an
existential phenomenon. Following the analyses of critical geographers Derek Gregory
and Gear6id O Tuathail, along with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, the place-
bound nature of human identity will be re-thought into a geo-historic and political
category that demonstrates the lived nature of geopolitics. By re-thinking the nature of
geopolitics, I will set up a framework of geographical responsibility (as seen in the work
of Matthew Sparke and Enrique Dussel) to approach the study of the state and of Western
modernity as a fundamentally human encounter of different perspectives and
interpretations, and not merely the teleological development of predetermined
international behavior.
Chapter Two presents a phenomenological genealogy of the constitutive power of
place and the role it plays in the identity formation of the modern state. By developing
the construction of the state as running parallel to that of the modern subject, a "logic of
composition," as seen in the work of Louiza Odysseos, can be drawn out concerning the
conception and practice of security in modern international relations. Following
Odysseos' own phenomenological understanding of international relations and
contemporary IR theory 0 , along with David Campbell's insights into the geopolitical
nature of ideas concerning U.S. national security, I will show how this logic of
composition has driven the practice of international relations away from a state of
coexistence to one of conflict and the effacement of difference.
20 Louiza Odysseos, The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
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Chapter Three will address the nature of modernization ideas in the Cold War
context of Latin American-U.S. relations, taking as its point of departure Ricardo
Salvatore's observation concerning the nature of local and imperial knowledge.2 1
According to Salvatore, U.S./Western hegemony in Latin America has been traditionally
understood through the constructions and modes of understanding by centers of culture
and knowledge situated in the core of the Western academic empire.22 These modes of
thinking are conditioned by representations (and subsequent counter-representations) of
the lived-experiences and encounters between North and South and their epistemic
rationales. Following the analyses of David Blaney, Naeem Inayatullah, Fernando
Coronil, Walter Mignolo and David Slater, the paradoxical nature of U.S. imperialism as
a post-colonial phenomenon in the guise of Occidentalism2 3 can be linked to the
increasingly globalized (and imperial) nature of international relations and knowledge in
culture, politics and especially education. By positing a post-Occidental understanding to
this problem, these thinkers' contribution allows for Latin American-U.S. relations (as a
microcosm of North-South relations) to be understood within the epistemic context of the
geopolitical and constitutive nature of knowledge and a phenomenon I call Cold War
Reason, an epistemic pathology that represents difference as a threat and vulnerability.
The failure to understand the constructed nature of these representations, and their
constitutive power in the interaction of centers of knowledge, leads to a reduction of the
21 Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Local versus Imperial Knowledge: Reflections on Hiram Bingham and
the Yale Peruvian Expedition," in Nepantla: Views from the South, (Vol. 4, Issue #1, 2003),
pp. 67-80
22 Ibid., p. 69.
23 David Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Re-Thinking North-South Relations (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 13.
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epistemic and lived nature of theory.2 4 By reifying modern political encounters to suit the
interests of world powers, these reductions form part of broader ontological systems of
pre-determined causes and effects that put international perspectives and traditions in a
position of conflict and exclusion, rather than in one of dialogue. The analysis of
geopolitical exclusion thus opens the path to a phenomenology of silence that sees the
expansion of Western thought and practices as geopolitical in nature, pushing voices and
alternatives of difference to the margins of broader global designs. By enunciating these
spaces of silence - that is to say, by listening to that which they have been forbidden to
say - the geopolitical nature of knowledge as a totality can be ruptured and new spaces of
exchange can be founded.
I will address this last problem by re-thinking Latin American-U.S. relations
within the context of what I will call a pedagogy of freedom. By using the
phenomenological understanding of geopolitics and Western modernity (Chapter Two),
along with the deployment of geopolitical representations found in Occidentalism
(Chapter Three), Chapter Four will address the broader concern of getting beyond
ourselves and our insulated modes of thought through teaching and the analysis of that
which makes up everyday life. As part of an attempt to dialogically resolve the tensions
in the study of Latin American-U.S. relations, this pedagogy of freedom seeks to show
how difference can emerge in the ambiguity of geopolitical knowledge as contextualized
in the critical experience of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. As a global phenomenon,
Freire suggests, the ideologies behind geopolitics go far beyond geographic behavior in
the international arena to largely influencing and localizing intellectual and social
24 Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, pp. 13-14.
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behavior as well.25 The geopolitical nature of knowledge and Western philosophy thus
imposes a series of epistemic fetters that keep philosophy and the social sciences under a
rubric of coloniality that marginalizes the contributions of thinkers from the developing
world. Geopolitical exclusion can nevertheless be transcended, as Dussel suggests, by de-
colonizing thought and transforming its interaction from being dialectical (assimilating)
to being analectical (communal): where every form of thought, as personal and
individual, recognizes itself in its exteriority, opening horizons of dialogue that are
beyond the totality of ontological constructions. 26 I will argue that this perspective
contributes to the geopolitical understanding of world politics by opening its attitude to
the myriad loci of enunciation that exist in the world, and how the inclusion of these
voices makes international relations a phenomenon defined by coexistence, rather than
self-interest, and makes agency a category that transcends both the boundaries of the state
and of academic disciplines.
By employing phenomenology, this work hopes to be presented as part of a
broader phenomenon meant to give praxis back to those on the "underside of history."
This phenomenon can be manifested as part of a heretical ontology of the social and the
post-colonial world that, in the spirit of the work of literary theorist Walter Mignolo,
"[emphasizes the] densities of the colonial experience [that] are the location of emerging
epistemologies," ways of thinking that do not seek to overthrow the existing ones, "but
25 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of Freedom: Ethics, Democracy and Civic Courage (Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 45-48.
26 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, trans. by Aquilina Martinez and Christine
Morkovsky (New York: Orbis, 1985), pp. 158-9.
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that build on the ground of the silence of history."27 Though some may maintain that this
task seems more suitable to the artist, the revolutionary, or even the politician, they forget
that the philosopher embodies all these identities and more. The horizons present before
us in any field of study are the result of complex human interactions in the world and the
meanings they produce and project onto the world as part of everyday life. These
interactions are not to be taken lightly as isolated phenomena of an otherwise
meaningless puzzle, but should rather be seen as part of our inherited way of being and
thus our fundamental responsibility to interpret and make sense out of. This second task
is itself a heavy burden since we cannot interpret these phenomena outside of their
particular and situated context if we mean to achieve anything we might call ethics,
understanding or truth.
The re-thinking of issues such as space, place, identity and their intricate
relationship to knowledge as a form of geopolitical action and/or resistance is
fundamental to the study of contemporary international relations. The world as we know
it is one that is always changing; yet these changes are not so much the result of isolated
ideologies as they are the result of the interaction of places and how the thought born out
of these places determines and conditions ideas and ideologies. The growing sentiment of
anti-imperialism and South-South cooperation in contemporary Latin America has boiled
over into a strange and difficult to assess wave of popular movements and leftist electoral
victories. 28 For better or worse, the extent and speed of the changes these movements
27 Mignolo, "The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference," in The South Atlantic
Quarterly, (101:1, Winter 2002), p. 67.
28 For one contemporary study, see: Nikolas Kozloff, Revolution!: South America and the Rise of
the New Left (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
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seek to bring about was impossible to imagine in the last five hundred years of modernity
and have begun to challenge the present state of Latin American-U.S. relations.
Emphasizing the exclusion with which the U.S. has traditionally approached Latin
American issues and problems, these challenges reflect a profound need for articulation
in times where, to paraphrase Marx's prophetic insight, the content has exceeded the
29
expression.
The phenomenological study of these phenomena contributes to international
relations thought and the study of geopolitics by resituating their representations and
discourse back to the lived-experience and history of the actors who drive this drama
forward. In short, phenomenology is an attempt to express the eclectic content of our
modern condition. It places the burden of listening back on the intellectuals in the North-
Atlantic community by giving voice to those that have been historically denied a space on
the stage of world politics. By following a more fruitful and collaborative form of
interaction, not only can we fulfill the most fundamental element of philosophical
thought, dialogue, but we do so by keeping in memory the soil from which it blooms.
29 The complete passage is written as followed: "The social revolution of the nineteenth century
cannot take its poetry from the past but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it
has stripped away all superstition about the past. The former revolutions required recollections of
past world history in order to smother their own content. The revolution of the nineteenth century
must let the dead bury their dead in order to arrive at its own content. There the expression went
beyond the content - here the content goes beyond the expression." See: Karl Marx, The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), The Portable Marx (New
York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1981), pp. 290. My italics.
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Chapter II: Space, Place and Identity in Contemporary Critical Thought
"Far from my body's being for me no more than a fragment of space,
there would be no space at allfor me if I had no body. "
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Chapter Two will attempt to re-think the relationship between space, place and
human identity, and how these factors inform our experience and understanding of
geopolitical phenomena. Underlying my analysis is the assumption that a broader
awareness of the phenomenological underpinnings of geopolitics will reveal a
geopolitical dimension to thought; that is to say, my analysis seeks to reveal the
geopolitical assumptions that inform modern thinkers and their forms of thought. By re-
situating the effects of this relationship on the methods and assumptions that seek to
study the nature of geopolitics, two objectives are intended: the first, to know how the
geopolitical is tied to our everyday practices and understanding of space and place, that is
to say, how the geopolitical is an existential phenomenon. Second, to determine if, by
understanding the phenomenological relationship between geopolitics and human
identity, a sense of geographical responsibility can emerge that will mark our intellectual
endeavors with the task of a phenomenological genealogy? The present task thus seeks to
understand how our experience of the world is always already a mutual engagement:
directed towards others and back to our critical methods.
Although my approach to the study of geopolitics appeals to phenomenological
insights into the human experience of space and place, any reflective engagement with
these categories (particularly at the level of geopolitics) requires an engagement with the
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 117
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assumptions and methods of a critical geography and a critical geopolitics. Not only is it
necessary to assess the contemporary methodological inroads that critical approaches to
geopolitics have contributed to the study of international relations, but even before that,
such an engagement would reveal affinities between phenomenology and critical
geopolitics that can mutually inform and broaden their respective insights. Comprised of
a range of strategies2 engaging with discourse analysis, identity politics, history,
environmental practices and media representations in popular culture, critical approaches
to geopolitics are informed by an ethos3 that challenges the representational dimension of
geopolitics as well as the geographic biases with which they have been traditionally
informed. The ethos in question seeks to reveal the structures of power and
marginalization that dominant actors strive to perpetuate, a task that pre-supposes a
phenomenology of subjectivity.
Phenomenology and the Ethos of Pluralization
For all its eminent contributions to the study of international relations and to the
analysis of geopolitical designs of power and oppression, I will argue that there remains a
missing factor from the analyses of critical geopolitics scholars that harkens to the great
debates of French philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. The debate
2 To name a few key texts, see: Gear6id O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics; David Campbell,
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Susan Schulten, The Geographical Imagination in
America: 1880-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Simon Dalby, Environmental
Security, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the
Cold War: Reader's Digest and American Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2000); and Frangois Debrix, Tabloid Terror: War, Culture, and Geopolitics (New York:
Routledge, 2008).
3 See: William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1995).
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between phenomenologists and structuralists (including their deconstruction and post-
structuralist cousins - vacuous terms often reflecting the politics of academia) is a debate
that, as greatly entertaining, exciting, and methodologically revealing as it may be, goes
excruciatingly beyond the bounds of the present work and must thus be relegated - not
for lack, but rather excess of importance - to the underside of the text.4 What I will retain
from this debate, however, can be found in Vincent Descombes' analysis of its central
philosophical point of contention:
After 1960, the sovereign subject is not 'overcome'...but multiplied. Instead of
being subjected to a single ego, the world must now manifest itself to a mass of
small supposita [individual beings subsisting in themselves], each tied to a
perspective... [Post-structural philosophy in particular] claims to overcome the
subject when it in fact suppresses the object...It declares that the text has no
referent outside itself, that the historical account relates no event exterior to the
account, that the interpretation has no bearing upon fact as distinguishable from
interpretation, and that the different vantage points do not look out upon a world
which is common to all perspectives." 5
It is from this world, "common to all perspectives," that the engagement of
phenomenology and critical geopolitics can begin. The different vantage points on the
world that post-structuralism champions, rather than broadening our understanding of
what "in ourselves and in others, precedes and exceeds reason,"6 have exacerbated the
instabilities within all unities of thought, particularly the "unity" that allegedly makes
thought possible at all: our embodied existence. Far from impoverishing thinking on the
political, the ethos of pluralization that informs critical geopolitics approaches has
4 For a concise, yet historically and philosophically engaged analysis of this debate, see: Vincent
Descombes, Le Mime et L 'Autre, trans. as Modern French Philosophy by L. Scott-Fox and J.M.
Harding (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
5 Ibid., pp. 187-89.
6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 122.
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nevertheless scattered the phenomenological emphasis on the lived-experience of the
world, focusing on particular experiences, a task that is not entirely divorced from
phenomenology.' As Descombes illustrates:
"[W]e live in one world in which we both see and say that 'the sun rises', and we
think in another, where we know the earth revolves around the sun. Conflict
exists between the lived world and the known world, between the percipio and
the cogito...if the lived world lies at the origin of the true world, it must, in its
way, be more truthful than the true one."8
To reiterate, post-structural thought has opened up new horizons for thinking about the
political and its representational practices, particularly as the primary intellectual force
behind critical geopolitics approaches. By privileging the strategies of enunciation,
however, post-structural thought takes for granted the ways we know and experience the
world. The pluralization of representational critiques thus generates certain epistemic
fetters of dispersion on the analyses of the lived-experience of geopolitics: of how
geopolitics (more than a phenomenon of geographic and discursive behavior) constitutes
the everyday life of peoples on its conquering and receiving ends. According to Anna
Secor, it is this constitution that is of interest for thinkers to investigate, a condition that is
best expressed as an existential dynamic:
7 Like all general characterizations, however, holes can be found at different instances of what
would be a comprehensive analysis of the breadth of critical geopolitics literature. For an
excellent example challenging this claim, see: Michael J. Shapiro, Methods and Nations: Cultural
Governance and the Indigenous Subject, (New York: Routledge, 2004). Shapiro, however, might
be more of an exception rather than the rule concerning a phenomenological emphasis on what
makes all political experience possible to begin with: the fact that it is embodied and lived. The
emphasis by most critical geopolitics scholars on the analysis of discourses of power and their
representation is perhaps the main point of contention that I believe a phenomenological
consideration may broaden and strengthen. An incendiary statement such as this, however,
deserves much more analysis than a footnote, yet for the ironic sake of space and time, this is all
that can be retained.
8 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, n. 11, p. 61.
21
"It is the eruption of language, the evocation of emotion, the expression of
suffering, of political and ethical aspiration, of loss, that may offer us a glimpse
of at least the tail-feathers of an idea of justice, an idea of right beyond what we
have known ... I cannot propose a route out [of this condition], but I can
pronounce the poetry that crackles in the voices of those...who have suffered and
have considered their suffering, at the threshold of [pure force]."9
The violence of geopolitical designs may be conceived of and understood through
discourse, media, and ideology, but its effects and development are made up of real flesh
and blood. The dispersion of this existential character of geopolitics, inadvertently
generated by post-structuralism, thus prolongs the marginalization of methods and forms
of expression of peoples whose historical experience (which often run counter to this
Western ethos of pluralization) is itself in the footnotes of the Western narrative and in
the underside of history. As hinted above, phenomenology then seeks to reveal the
existential dynamic of the geopolitical.
Investigating The Roots of Knowledge: Embodied Consciousness
Phenomenology is a method of investigation that seeks to describe human
existence as embodied-consciousness, allowing for the reflection of the social and the
political as phenomena that are existentially rooted in a commonly shared world - a
world that shapes and is shaped by this understanding of human consciousness.
Philosophical definitions aside, phenomenology is about returning to beginnings: of
things, of experience, of thoughts and ideas. Far from being a mere nostalgic endeavor,
this return is motivated by what John Sallis calls "a turn back toward something from
9 Anna J. Secor, "An Unrecognizable Condition Has Arrived": Law, Violence, and the State of
Exception in Turkey," in Derek Gregory and Allan Pred (eds.), Violent Geographies: Fear,
Terror, and Political Violence, (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 37-53.
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which we have somehow become remote,"10 the human experiences that precede and
inform our ideas of the world. The understanding of experience, he suggests, "is not
merely to duplicate or re-inscribe it but requires reference to something from which it
gets understood, something on the basis of which it comes to be interpreted."" It is the
sensibility of human experience that allows us to internalize phenomena and "make sense
of it" according to the categories and basis of understanding we develop as a human self.
Through such a phenomenological genealogy, the origins and context of
phenomena are brought back to consciousness in order to reveal the practices and
strategies that inform and affect our understanding of reality. By re-situating the ways we
interpret political realities, phenomenology problematizes contemporary literature on the
subject of geopolitics by taking apart the assumptions of both mainstream and critical
thinkers about the geopolitical nature of knowledge. By reflecting on their thought as part
of their own experience, the possibilities of admitting the experiences of others into their
reflections are opened. Phenomenology thus acts as a refractive mirror: it shows us what
our own thought looks like, demanding we look beyond ourselves as part of the method,
and allowing us to "[learn] to see what is ours as alien and what was alien as ours."' 2
In order to fully understand the relationship between phenomenology and critical
approaches to geopolitics, however, it is necessary to return to the beginnings of these
critical strategies and highlight what we may call the foundations of a phenomenology of
space and place. Through a pre-phenomenology, as a return to methodological
10 John Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 1973), p. 9.
" Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, p. 10.
12 Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 120.
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beginnings, I seek to draw out the webs of harmony between a geographic and a
phenomenological understanding of geopolitics. By examining the notions of geographic
self-understanding and geographical constellations, notions that are implicit and explicit
in the work of critical geographers and critical geopolitics thinkers such as Derek
Gregory and Gear6id O Tuathail, the ground can be cleared for an understanding of
geopolitics as a condition of embodied im-placement: a condition concerned with the
lived-experience of the geopolitical that forms an inextricable part of the everyday
practice of geopolitics. As an existential understanding, embodiment not only precedes
the strategies of critical geopolitics scholars, but also informs and underlies their
analyses, curiously remaining on the margins and footnotes of their works.13 The
uncovering of these webs will demonstrate that both phenomenology and critical
geopolitics, far from being antagonistic, complement each other in ways that broaden and
"de-colonize" the study of geopolitics and international relations. In clearer terms, critical
approaches to geopolitics can become stronger and more inclusive if they allow a space
for phenomenological analyses, just as phenomenology can find new grounds of inquiry
and forms of expression by examining the approaches of critical geopolitics.
13 Not unlike post-structuralism and deconstruction, by speaking from the footnotes, margins and
traces of existence, phenomenology highlights the qualities in human consciousness that allow for
my interpretation of phenomena and events. Indeed, the point of my critique lies in the fact that
most post-structuralist methods, in varying degrees and moments, fail to highlight these
conditions (i.e., embodiment, perception, geo-historicity) in their own work and thus run the risk
of falling into the types of practices that they are critical of. In another sense, as we will see
further down with Matthew Sparke's notion of geographical responsibility, post-structuralist
approaches are themselves guilty of privileging certain forms of understanding that can eclipse or
marginalize other approaches to understanding geopolitics, often because they run counter to
"standards" of Western philosophy and academia.
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Critical Geographies and the Prose of Geopolitics
"There is no essence, no idea, that does not adhere to a domain of history and of geography."'4
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty
The traditional study of social and political existence often presupposes and takes
for granted a conception of the world that posits societies, territories and states as
inevitable or logical events reflecting the development of human thought and interaction.
These constructions presuppose ideas that we may have about the space around us, the
places we see and inhabit, and the ways we identify these places. By thinking through
these issues without reflecting on their assumptions, however, they also presuppose and
inscribe an identity onto us. As the poet Adrienne Rich suggests, "a place on the map is
also a place in history."15 The ways we understand the world are always already rooted
in-the-world. To uncover the webs of harmony between phenomenology and the critical
study of geography (approaches that similarly question and re-think the historical
assumptions of their respective traditions) we have to question the composition of the
alleged waltz of universal reason that informs our traditional understanding of geography,
history and philosophy. We must engage this composition on the very grounds that
inform its rationale, taking on those domains of reality that adhere and hold fast to their
ideas and constructions of humanity. A critical engagement with geography, philosophy
and the history of their development is thus an engagement with the very elements of
what Western modernity has claimed makes us human.
14 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1968), p. 20.
15 Adrienne Rich, "Notes Towards a Politics of Location," in Blood, Bread and Poetry - Selected
Prose: 1979-1985, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1986), p. 27.
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For contemporary critical geographers, such an engagement reached its most
recent apogee with the end of the Cold War and the proclamation of an allegedly "new"
world order. Essentially meant as a political order, certain scholars argued it reflected a
new intellectual order as well.16 In 1994, Simon Dalby announced a fundamental, yet
historically disregarded, reminder for the contemporary study of political geography and
international relations. Challenging the epistemic fetters (historical and geographic)
imposed by the Cold War hijacking of the study of geopolitics, Dalby asserted that rather
than being about objectivity and generalization, "writing about politics inevitably
involves taking a political stance...political geography cannot escape its subject
matter."' 7 He maintained that the categories and principles which political geography
conceives are fundamentally tied to the place and politics they emerge from, turning the
issue from an academic task to one concerning everyday life.' 8 As it concerns geography,
which Hegel considered "the single most efficacious basis of history,"19 the issue for
Dalby was not only of bringing geography back to a position of unfettered political
criticism, but it also concerned the epistemological dilemma of designing an ontology for
geography. Geographers needed to establish the space and scope of geographical analysis
16 The literature announcing the "end of history" and the rise of "new world orders" in the early
1990's is vast and complex. For key original sources, see: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History
and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992); Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy;
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Re-Making of World Order; and Charles
W. Kegley, Jr., "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New
International Realities," ISA Presidential Address March 2 7th, 1993 (Acapulco, Mexico), in
International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 37, No. 2, Jun. 1993), pp. 131-146.
17 Simon Dalby, "Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference and Dissent," in Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space, (Vol. 9, No. 3, 1994), pp. 261-83, esp.: p. 262.
18 Ibid., p. 267
19 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Amherst: Prometheus, 1991), pp. 79-80.
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in order to find a place in the social sciences for geography to be. There is a certain risk
of encapsulating geography in this way, but as Derek Gregory and Yi-Fu Tuan suggested
years earlier, this disciplinary anxiety over the space of geographical thinking and a
place-to-be is historically pervasive:
"The dilemma is not a new one...geography always has been and always will be
'stretched between knowledge and existence,' between an environmentalism
where the geographer 'seeks meaning in order and finds a largely determined,
timeless and tidy world' and an existentialism where he 'seeks meaning in the
landscape as he would in literature, because it is a repository of human
striving."' 20
The study of geography has therefore always been in need of a transformation that
allowed it to reconcile the way it conceived of space and place, and how these two
determine and are determined by the human identities that struggle in its midst. Tuan's
use of the metaphor of landscape as text" is a valuable contribution here for the analysis
of the way geography affects our lives: by reading landscape as a "repository of human
striving" we can read the study and practices of geography and geopolitics as part of a
perpetual search for a home, one that is not always simply textual. This home, as a place
to call my own (both figuratively and literally), is one that I can understand and express
in both words and actions. Such a home is also a world that I experience across time and
history, which can also change meanings as much as I can make changes to it, ultimately
20 Derek Gregory, Ideology, Science and Human Geography, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1978)
p. 124. See also: Yi-Fu Tuan, "Geography, Phenomenology, and the Study of Human Nature," in
Canadian Geographer (Vol. 15, No. 3, 1971), pp. 181-92.
21 For an important contribution to the understanding of landscape as crucial to the formation of a
body politic and national narratives, see: Kenneth Robert Olwig, Landscape Nature and the Body
Politic: From Britain's Renaissance to America's New World (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 2002).
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amounting to a process that changes me and demands that I understand myself as well -
the elements of the eternal task of self-understanding.
As Gregory maintains, the study of geography and self-understanding are
coextensive human phenomena that inform each other in their experience of time and
history. Yet the key to geographical self-understanding, he suggests, may also lie
somewhere beyond myself
"[T]hat the landscape somehow has the key to our understanding of it within
itself...amounts to the counter-claim that the key is to be found somewhere
within ourselves, so that, by extension, an authentic - Tuan would say humane -
geography would not seek to impose its own (negotiated) frame of reference on
the world but would instead attempt to understand other frames of reference and
to mediate between what we might think of as various 'lay' and 'technical'
constructions of the world."22
At the philosophical level, what Gregory suggests is crucial for understanding how places
relate to each other and where geography falls in this relation as the foundation for
humane geographies (and by extension, perhaps, humane thought). His analysis suggests
that a geographic understanding of our experience of place should temper and filter out
the "technical constructions" of the world and of the people that find themselves "inside."
In a geopolitical context, a humane geographic understanding (one that sees geography
and human identity as coextensive) would have to be one that actively questions and
challenges the "negotiated" designs of geopolitical power imposed through the
geographies (and geographers) of a state, but also of critical scholars as well: self-
understanding should always be self-critical.23 Gregory's sense of mediation thus
22 Gregory, Ideology, Science and Human Geography, p. 124. My italics.
23 For a detailed study of the development of U.S. geopolitical and geo-economic designs of
power through the work of geographers of state such as Isaiah Bowman, see: Neil Smith,
American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization, (Berkeley:
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conceives of geographic self-understanding as a relation between landscapes and
language (where we can read landscapes as texts and texts as landscapes). Such a relation
is fundamental to the understanding of socio-political realities, but also to existential
realities about the human condition in the modern world. Geography as a form of self-
understanding, as a prose of the world, thus acts as a form of expression (writing) that, as
Merleau-Ponty suggests, attempts to "recover for us the life of our thought,"2 4 a key
insight for the conception of geopolitics as the writing of space.25
By illustrating this phenomenological conception of geography as self-
understanding, we begin to see the potential for geography as something liberating, but
also, as we will see in the following section, as something that is perpetually entrapping
as well. A geography that challenges the constitutive practices of "negotiated" designs
(and modes of thought) by visualizing landscape as text (as part of a primordial landscape
for human expression 26) also seeks to reveal the meanings of already existing spaces of
being. It seeks to exercise an agency that makes manifest the potentialities and
experiences informing the landscapes of the silenced spaces of history, revealing the
University of California Press, 2003). Smith's "critical biography" of Bowman is a powerful
example and revealing portrait of the self-criticism that Bowman lacked in his geographic
endeavors and of the "visualizing" power of geography.
24 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1973), p. 5. My italics.
2 For a definitive example of this conception, see: O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics.
26 See: Gregory, Ideology, Science and Human Geography, p. 124 and O Tuathail, Critical
Geopolitics, p. 161. As noted above, geography for Gregory is always stretched between
knowledge and existence, between conceptualization and the dynamic changes of human self-
understanding and becoming. O Tuathail's analyses look at these changes as reflections of
historical, social processes that have turned geography into the service of the state. As we will see
in Chapter Two, this geopolitical shift has politicized geographical reasoning and alienated its
connections to human expression and the basic experiences of space and place.
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webs of harmony for engaging in dialogue. Such a process attempts to rupture the
totalizing rationalities through which geopolitical practices of 'placing' and 'naming'
(and place-naming) construct alienating realities that place us at odds with each other
(epistemically as well as geopolitically). As Gregory reminds us, "places have been
deformed and made into arenas which respond to the external dictates of an abstract
rationality rather than to the intentional structures of the people who live in them and
invest them with their meanings."2 7 It should be noted, however, that these are
characteristics of experience and conceptualization that are common of all geographies
(geo-graphing). Through geopolitical practices, places are politicized - yet by already
possessing certain intentional structures, even a humane geography risks a re-
politicization that makes it part of a broader constellation of the geopolitical, a
constellation that also demands a self-critical awareness.
Constellations of Critical Space
The critical engagement with the problems of geography and geopolitics is a
process that attempts to bridge the gap between the real world and pure consciousness.
As a process that is intentionally driven towards others and outside of itself, but also back
into itself, a critical engagement establishes the possibility of creative, human
imagination as the means through which we express our experience of the world. It
achieves this by positing human activity, interaction and understanding as part of a
constellation of meanings: a broad and intertwined web through which motives and
intentions are existentially engendered and mutual meanings are made possible. In clearer
terms, a critical understanding of geography and geopolitics is informed by a
27 Gregory, Ideology, Science and Human Geography, p. 124
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phenomenological drive to express our experience of the world and its places, a desire for
a kind of self-understanding that is simultaneously a geographic understanding, that is to
say, as being-in-the-world.28 Though there is an allegedly emancipating spirit to the
description of this geographic self-understanding, there remains something to be said
about the constellation of meanings that inform our particular experiences of the
geopolitics of space and place, or rather of the geopolitical in our understanding of these.
The metaphor of constellation thus allows us to briefly discuss what informs the
approaches of critical geopolitics scholars as an element of this constellation, in particular
their relation to phenomenology and their conceptions of the constitutive powers of space
and place.
The nature of a critical geopolitics can hardly be defined by one single principle
or method. In fact, as Simon Dalby and Gearoid O Tuathail suggest, "[t]hat which has
come to be known as 'critical geopolitics' can be understood as one constellation within
this larger universe of research...a situation that resists mastery by a single principle or
final reconciliation around a revealed core." 29 Such a sense of a constellation, put briefly
aside from any of the previous phenomenological implications, emerges from what
Richard Bernstein calls "the ethical-political horizons of modernity,"30 a condition that
28 Louiza Odysseos's masterful work on Heideggerian phenomenology as a way to challenge the
logic of composition that informs traditional approaches to international relations and geography
reveals in detail the way that understanding ourselves as Da-Sein (there-being), as always already
fundamentally tied to others and the world, allows us to displace and overcome the epistemic
fetters of the Hobbesian, self-interested understanding of world politics. See Louiza Odysseos,
The Subject of Coexistence, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007)
29 Simon Dalby and Gearoid O Tuathail, "Editorial Introduction: The Critical Geopolitics
Constellation: Problematizing Fusions of Geographical Knowledge and Power," in Political
Geography, (Vol. 15, No. 6/7, 1996), pp. 451-52.
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asks all forms of human understanding to "test and risk [their] convictions and
prejudgments in and through an encounter with what is radically 'other' and alien."3' As
Bernstein develops in greater detail, this constellation throws into doubt any rationalized
basis or justification for our affirmations or even critiques, scattering and displacing the
once incomparable dialectical power of the subject of modernity:
"There are always unexpected contingent ruptures that dis-rupt the project of
reconciliation. The changing elements of the new constellation resist such
reduction. What is 'new' about this constellation is the growing awareness of the
depth of radical instabilities. We have to learn to think and act in the 'in-
between' interstices of forced reconciliations and radical dispersion."3 2
There are two elements that I want to focus on with Bernstein's image: the first concerns
the dark corners of thought that this new constellation seeks to explore and put into
dialogue, and the second concerns the very nature of this dialogue as a "space-in-
between,"3 as a critical project that seeks to reveal personal, existential strategies that
challenge the geopolitical.
A critical understanding of geopolitics not only seeks to undress the geopolitical
designs of power that inform the narratives and behavior of states and individuals, but is
also ultimately an attempt to shine light on the social and political alternatives that these
designs eclipse. As O Tuathail reminds us, geopolitics is a concept that shrouds and
30 Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of
Modernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992).
3' Bernstein, The New Constellation, p. 4
32 Ibid., pp. 8-9
3 This is a difficult term that is used by both Brazilian philosopher Silviano Santiago (see p. 35)
and by North American geographer Matthew Sparke (see p. 50), in distinct, yet complementary
contexts. Its significance for the present work will be developed in the rest of this chapter.
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overshadows meaning, even its own meanings, the result of an allegedly universal project
proposing an end to all uncertainties:
"Geopolitics is not a concept that is immanently meaningful and fully present to
itself but a discursive 'event' that poses questions to us whenever it is evoked and
rhetorically deployed. It is a problematic best approached historically and con-
textually, a problematic concerning the writing of the global that requires an
antiglobal(izing) method of inquiry that avoids treating 'it' as a stable and
singular 'it', a linear and smooth historical surface for theoretical work." 34
The existential flux of geopolitics, its "essential" instability which is also its greatest
challenge, is to constantly present itself as a stable and universal alternative, a
landscaping of human reality that reveals only one word, one possible way of reading
existence. Whereas O Tuathail is concerned with the discursive con-text that address the
writing and disciplining of geopolitical practices and their structures of power,35 my
concern is with the experiential and phenomenological context from which geopolitics
emerges from and embarks upon. Such a context is always already informed by drives for
"stability" and "self-referentiality," an environment that presents itself, in O Tuathail's
words, as "a linear and smooth historical surface for theoretical work," but which is
hardly the case. As I began to address above, these drives form part of geography's
disciplinary search for a home, making geopolitics the self-excessive expression of the
desire for a geographic ontology: a design attributing politicized ends and purposes to
geography and the places it seeks to know.
O Tuathail's approach, like that of most critical geopolitics scholars, is post-
structural and deconstructive, mine is phenomenological: both part from the impetus to
express certain experiences of the world and its places - they are localized
3" O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 17. My italics.
35 Ibid., p. 65
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phenomenologies of geopolitics (or as O Tuathail suggests, "antiglobal-[izing] methods
of inquiry"). Whereas the critical geopolitics project (broadly characterized) is part of a
constellation of what I call genealogicalphenomenologies: investigations into the diverse
manifestations of the geopolitical; my project, however, seeks a geographic
understanding that is simultaneously a self-understanding, a method that seeks to reveal
both the place-bounded character of the geopolitical and its place-bounded origins in the
human individual. Far from antagonistic to each other, they share a similar drive
particularly when Dalby writes that to practice critical geopolitics is:
"nothing less than a recognition of the importance of studying the political
operation of forms of geographical understanding, recognizing that geographs
are specifications of political reality that have political effects. To construct
critical political geographies is to argue that we must not limit our attention to a
study of the geography of politics within pre-given, taken-for-granted spaces,
commonsense spaces, but investigate the politics of the geographical
specification ofpolitics."36
Geopolitics is always internal and external: it parts from an understanding of self and
other as always situated before it proposes an understanding of the nation and the state as
politicized manifestations of this original condition. Crucial in Dalby's explanation of
critical geopolitics is his emphasis on geographical understanding as something already
politicized (already about power) and the need to investigate the politics of the
geographical specification of politics. These two themes have significant
phenomenological ties and implications concerning space and place that highlight the
existential (self-understanding) impetus behind geographic understanding, and the
localized and place-bound dimension (geographical specification) of geopolitical forms
of understanding. In a methodological sense, these themes invoke links to areas of study
36 Simon Dalby, "Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference and Dissent," p. 274.
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and philosophical approaches that are part of a broad challenge to the socio-political
designs of modernity and the West37 - in simpler terms, they are constellations-at-work.
The Space-In-Between: Bridging Geopolitics and Critical Thought
The present section (demonstrating a concern that coincides with the second
element in Bernstein's characterization of "the new constellation") turns now towards the
character of the critical geopolitics approach as a "space-in-between": a critical endeavor
that aims at disrupting the domination of old modes of thinking geopolitics, while at once
putting the diverse elements of the new constellation in a dialogue of a different kind. As
the Brazilian philosopher Silviano Santiago maintains, the critical impetus that precedes
this dialogue is always intentional (directed against) and creative of new situations. For
the Latin American thinker in particular, he writes, "To speak, to write, means to speak
against, to write against." 38 Invoking a spirit that runs parallel to Roland Barthes'
distinction of readerly and writerly texts, 39 Santiago maintains that critical space is
always part of a digression from what is already written (le ddjd-dcrit), but a digression
that must always run through its object: it is an act of "[learning] first the language of the
37 Of significant importance in the investigation of "the geographical specification of politics" are
the contributions of Enrique Dussel and Walter Mignolo and their studies of the geopolitics of
knowledge, a theme underlying the entirety of this work and to treated in Chapters Two and
Three. Of particular importance, see: Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, trans. by
Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky, (New York: Orbis, 1985); Walter Mignolo, Local
Histories / Global Designs, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Walter Mignolo
(ed.), Capitalismo y geopolitica del conocimiento, (Buenos Aires: Duke University, Ediciones del
signo, 2001)
38 Silviano Santiago, "Latin American Discourse: The Space In-Between," in The Space In-
Between: Essays on Latin American Culture, trans. by Tom Burns, Ana Ldcia Gazzola (ed.), and
Gareth Williams, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001) p. 31
39 Roland Barthes, S/Z: An Essay, trans. by Richard Miller, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974)
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metropolis in order to then combat it more effectively."4 0 Critical thought is thus an act
that appropriates "the rising star" of Western modernity, "the pure and unattainable star
that contaminates without ever sullying itself," in order to effect a critical imaginary
(geographic and epistemic) that "should affirm itself as a writing upon another writing." 41
For Santiago, this interplay of words and resistance is reflective of the most existential
experiences and drives:
"The Latin American writer plays with the signs of another writer and of another
work. The words of the other present themselves as objects that fascinate his
eyes, his fingers, and the writing of the second text becomes partially the story of
a sensual experience with foreign signs ... the work of the writer becomes a kind
of global translation, a pastiche, a parody or a digression rather than a literal
translation." 42
A phenomenological reading of this new critical space reveals that the critical is a site, a
geo-graphy, of listening and learning before ever becoming a site from which a challenge
may arise; it is a space of historical experience and of self-understanding (historically
violent and destructive) before ever becoming a space for "prophetic criticism" and
testimony. 43 Yet even before the formal construction of a "space-in-between" - a space
40 Santiago, "Latin American Discourse: The Space In-Between," p. 33
41 Ibid., p. 34
42 Ibid. My italics.
43 I use very particular meanings for these two terms that challenge conventional use and are
intimately close to their use in the works of Martin Buber, Karl Marx, Primo Levi and Enrique
Dussel. Though my use of these will be developed in much greater detail in Chapter Three, I take
the prophetic to refer to its biblical context, where to be prophetic is to be involved in the constant
call and exhortation for justice; see: Martin Buber, "The Demand of the Spirit and Historical
Reality," in Pointing the Way, trans. by Maurice Friedman (ed.) (New York: Schocken, 1957),
pp. 177-91 and Enrique Dussel, Ethics and Community, trans. by Robert Barr, (Maryknoll: Orbis
Books, 1988). By testimony, I mean the responsibility that those of us who continue to live in
history have, in spite of disaster and tragedy the world over, to invoke those who have been
forgotten by history. For a comprehensive collection dealing on opposite sides of this issue, see:
Linda Martin Alcoff and Eduardo Mendieta, (eds.), Thinking From the Underside of History:
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from which critical analysis can emerge and challenge the authoritarian constructions of a
geopolitics of knowledge - the interplay of signs, writers and works is informed by an
existential character that lies somewhere between geography and philosophy, between
landscape and thought, and ultimately between self and other. Such a space-in-between is
thus a bridge that links thoughts, as well as particular places and peoples, together to
form a place-in-between: a second site through which, as Santiago infers, one "fully
[understands] the implications of the movement towards the star [of modernity].. .in order
to inscribe his project on the horizons of Western culture."4 4 It is an act that challenges
the imposition of foreign concepts by appropriating and "re-contaminating" them, a
mestizdje or hybridity that speaks back to the star of its origins as a place that is radically
other yet somehow always shared, constituting the identities of both the conquered and
the conqueror. I will return to this project from the horizons in much greater detail in
Chapter Four.
For present concerns, however, Santiago's contribution reveals how the idea of
critical space, as part of the experience of the univocality of geopolitical designs, attempts
to bridge thoughts, peoples and places. The present work may itself be seen as reflective
of that critical space, as one that attempts to understand the place-bound origins of both
classical and critical geopolitical thought.45 Given our present concerns, however, that
possibility will be explored towards the end, only after I have investigated the other
Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2000); see also: Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity, (New York:
Touchstone, 1996).
as Santiago, "Latin American Discourse: The Space In-Between," p. 32.
as O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 142.
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factors that inform this analysis. It is now necessary to move on to a phenomenological
genealogy of this place-in-between, and how our understanding and experience of place
gives an existential character to geopolitics, as a phenomenon that is both constituted-by
and constitutive-of our practices of everyday life. Following the analyses of Patricia
Price, places only attain meaning through a common and embodied co-presence:
"there is no such thing as place knowledge, or having a sense of place, that can
exist outside of being in a particular place: there is no such thing as a general
experience of place...We are ineluctably, inescapably emplaced beings. Our
grasp of place is thoroughly, specifically experiential, and this is mutual." 46
The experience of place, as one of "inescapably emplaced" beings, is one that we come
into contact with through our bodies. Place, more than the Kantian understanding of
space and time, is the very ground that makes understanding possible as a result of our
lived-experience of the world. The lived-experience of place, however, has the potential
to degenerate our understanding of place from one that sees it as the origin of human
thought, to an understanding that posits and imagines place as being empty, docile
containers to human thought's ends - repositories for the constructed inventions of an
allegedly modern, sovereign subject. This potential is what I will refer to from now on as
the geopolitical nature of thought, a condition that will be further clarified in Chapter
Three, after first elaborating the existential character of both space and geopolitics and
how they fundamentally affect our experience of place.
By investigating the existential relationship between space and human thought, as
informed by the phenomenological project of Merleau-Ponty, I seek to reveal the
epistemic foundations for the human experience of place. As elements that allow for a
46 Patricia Price, Dry Place: Landscapes of Belonging and Exclusion (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press, 2004), p. 11.
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sense of continuity in our general experience of the world, these foundations also inform
the geographical inventions of geopolitics, reflecting what O Tuathail describes as "the
power struggle between different societies over the right to speak sovereignly about
geography, space, and territory." 47 Such a power struggle is not only constitutive of
human identities, but is reflective of the power of place to constitute these identities, a
power that is eclipsed by the inventions of geopolitics. Why does a power struggle occur?
What is it about human existence that informs the notions of territory and sovereignty
that drive international politics? What allows for human beings to fight amongst
themselves and establish lines of demarcation within the expansive horizon of existence
called the life-world? The answer to these questions not only lies somewhere between
geography and philosophy, between phenomenology and critical geopolitics, but
ultimately lies between the self, the other and the world, as central elements of human
existence in need of re-thinking.
Lived-Space and the Existential Character of Geopolitics
"[Perception] is not a question of reducing knowledge to sensation, but of assisting at the birth of
this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover
the consciousness of rationality."4 8
- Edward Said
Geopolitics concerns all of us: it shapes both the politico-spatial manifestations of
the world in which we live (creating borders and boundaries), and also the ways
(epistemologies) with which we come to understand that world and our place in it. In
producing discourses about world politics, geopolitics not only seeks to understand and
47 O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 11.
48 Edward Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000), p. 8
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describe the place of political power in the world, but also attempts to make spaces for
that power.49 As a global phenomenon, however, geopolitics goes beyond a geographic
understanding in the international system to largely influencing and localizing
intellectual behavior as well.50 Understood in this light, geopolitics is a fundamentally
existential phenomenon of the contemporary international system: it has the power to
constitute personal, human meaning, since existence is not only determined by our social,
economic and geographic being, but by our intellectual life as well.51 Thought and self-
understanding are bounded-to and bounded-by space and place, just as space and place, in
Gregory's language, respond to "the intentional structures of the people who live in them
and invest them with their meanings."52
The existential character of geopolitics is thus rooted in the conception that space
(as a human and political phenomenon) is, as Merleau-Ponty maintains, "not the setting
(real or logical) in which things are arranged, but the means whereby the positing of
things becomes possible."53 Space allows for meaning to take root in the world only as
lived-space, as the soil for human perception, orientation, and action to play out a web of
stories and meanings on its stage.54 The meaning of the things that are posited here is
49 Gear6id O Tuathail, "Thinking Critically About Geopolitics," p. 1.
50 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p. 3.
" Walter Mignolo (ed.), in Capitalismo y geopolitica del conocimiento (Buenos Aires: Duke
University, Ediciones del signo, 2001), p. 13.
52 Gregory, Ideology, Science and Human Geography, p. 124.
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 218.
" John F. Bannan, The Philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.,
1967) p. 95
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determined by who is writing the narratives of the story, their identities also constituted
by place. In a geopolitical context, ideas of space and place (and how their meanings are
determined) have the power to condition the interests of groups, states, nations, and
individual people, through the writing of similar narratives (cartographic and
ideological). 5 For political purposes, these narratives are constitutive of apolitical space;
they replicate the existential and human desire to create a place-to-be, but as part of
political and ideological objectives of power. In many instances, these narratives are
dressed in the language of shared impulses towards idealized forms of being, that is to
say, in the language of collective interests and practical ways of life. 56
Just as human actions are determined by the material, ideational and historical
conditions that they are rooted in, geopolitical actions are contingent on the material
possibilities and epistemic structures from which they emerge. As we will see further
down, discourses such as modernization attempt to imbue space and particular places
with meanings that facilitate the establishment of certain material and intellectual
" For analysis on the cartographic nature of ideology, see: Gearoid O Tuathail, Critical
Geopolitics; Susan Schulten, The Geographical Imagination in America; and Michael J. Shapiro,
Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997).
56 The spread of Christianity, Capitalism, Socialism, and today "Globalization," are all historical
instances and manifestations of these collective drives and their transformation into global
representations. Modernization and human rights discourses, for example, are two similar
representational instances of U.S.-based geopolitical designs that will receive much more detailed
treatment in Chapter Three. Briefly, however, as Tzvetan Todorov suggests in his critical re-
reading of the "discovery" of the Americas: colonization has been historically represented as a
"civilizing" endeavor that brought Christianity to a "New World," rather than as a process of
invasion and conquest, culminating in the savage decimation of an indigenous civilization that
was alien and other to an embryonic European modernity; see: Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of
America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). Enrique Dussel also
highlights the events of 1492 as the origins of "the myth of modernity," the practical foundations
of the West's intellectual drive for primacy and domination; see: Enrique Dussel, The Invention
of the Americas: Eclipse of "The Other" and the Myth of Modernity, trans. by Michael D. Barber
(New York: Continuum, 1995).
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structures of power. By speaking of geopolitical constructions as being contingent on
geo-historical circumstances, and how these circumstances condition (and are
conditioned by) the epistemic horizons that express their objectives, we begin to question
the foundations on which all forms of knowing take place and dig out the geopolitical
nature of knowledge and its effects on our understanding and practice of international
relations.
Geopolitics is thus reflective of a basic existential desire for place and the
expansion of place.57 The categories which inform this desire - our embodied experience
of space, the constitutive power of place on human identity, and the social desire to
inhabit places - need to be fleshed out from the totalizing narratives of geopolitics. Not
only will we thus reveal the conquering impetus behind geopolitical narratives, but also
what contemporary critical geopolitics approaches take for granted in their analyses: the
very experience of space as prompted by place. As Edward Casey suggests, by engaging
in a phenomenological genealogy of these experiences, and how they inform our desire
and practices of habitation and gathering, we can trace how our bodies and actions
"reflect the kind of places we inhabit."58 Through the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, we
can re-construct the categories that inform geopolitical practices as instances of embodied
5 As Neil Smith points out, the power of empires cannot be read as "total, spaceless, devoid of
any significant geography," but rather as "always [residing] in place...disproportionately wielded
by a ruling class that remains tied to [national interests]." See: Smith, American Empire, pp. xix.
58 Edward S. Casey, "How To Get From Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time:
Phenomenological Prolegomena," in Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso (eds.), Senses of Place,
(Santa Fe: School of American Research, 1996), p. 19
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im-placement, allowing us to then uncover a sense of geographical responsibility for our
analysis of geopolitics, a sense rooted in the very experience of geopolitics. 59
The Spatial Structure of Consciousness
Existence as embodied consciousness lies at the center of the phenomenological
understanding of space and place, an understanding that finds its strongest description in
the phenomenology of perception expressed by Merleau-Ponty. Rather than following the
Kantian understanding of space as an a priori intuition of human reason, Merleau-Ponty
sees the human subject as the origin of space. 60 He does not suggest that we follow a
Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, or of the self as the constitutive agent of all reality,
but rather that we see human existence as embodied existence, consciousness as always
already situated-in-the-world, and space as always already lived-space. His
phenomenology is central to understanding the place that human beings hold in space
(existentially and geopolitically) since it describes our relation to the world, prior to our
understanding, as pre-reflective.6 1
59 This re-construction shares many connections with critical approaches to geopolitics: self-
understanding, difference, identity and power are all categories that are perpetuated through
geographical and popular representations; along with the analysis and disruption of these
strategies through genealogies of language, geography and forms of understanding, they are all
informed (at least implicitly) by the phenomenological re-construction of the fundamentally
spatial character of human existence.
60 As John Bannan writes: "Just as I am not an object because I am the condition for there being
objects, so also I am not in space because I am the source of space [as the embodied subject
already living space]...It is by its actions and its very movement of existence that the [human]
body enters the figure-background structure [the spatial unity of the body] or addresses any of its
tasks, and hence it is in action that its peculiar spatiality is accomplished." See: Bannan, The
Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, pp. 69-70
61 As Laurie Spurling writes, there is an alleged "original unity of human existence" underlying
the analyses of phenomenology that not only understands consciousness as embodied and in-the-
world, but which demands that in order to achieve "a unified and coherent perspective on man in
the world," we need "an investigation of man's naive experience" of the pre-reflective, a task that
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Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, as a phenomenology of lived-
experience, is a form of understanding this pre-reflective condition that is actively
engaged with the geo-historical circumstances of human existence, critically investigating
the foundations on which all human sociality is based.62 For Merleau-Ponty, the inherent
intentionality of the human body, as the vehicle through which we constitute and receive
meaning in the world (always directed towards the world and back to itself), entails a
corporeal presence in space that allows for the constitution of meanings. It is in this
sense that Merleau-Ponty understands space as "the means whereby the positing of things
becomes possible,"63 a pre-reflective moment that is crucial for both the "production of
space" and the constitution of human existence as spatial.64 Such a "co-constitution"
(being-in-the-world) occurs for Merleau-Ponty through what he sees as the dialectical
relationship between the embodied nature of existence and the inherent constitutive
quality of space through which the human self expresses its being:
involves a return to the beginnings of intentionality as central to the human self. See: Laurie
Spurling, Phenomenology and the Social World, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) p. ix.
62 As John O'Neill suggests, Merleau-Ponty's study "is no retreat from the world because his
thought is an inexhaustible digging at the roots of our inherence in the world, nature and history."
See: John O'Neill, Perception, Expression, and History: The Social Phenomenology of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) p. xi. In a critical sense, his
philosophy is itself reflective of a phenomenology of geopolitics, as he was actively engaged in
questioning the changing intellectual and material circumstances of the nascent Cold War as he
lived through them. This personal inherence is best captured in his work Adventures of the
Dialectic (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), a critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's
defense of Soviet expansionism in the early 1950s, The Communists and Peace, (New York:
George Braziller, 1968).
63 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 243
64 As Bannan reiterates, "Reflection on the experience of the spatial dimensions of perceived
objects leads back to the fundamental spatial character of human existence." See: Bannan, The
Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, p. 99
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"We have said that space is existential...that existence is spatial, that is, that
through an inner necessity it opens on to an 'outside', so that one can speak of a
mental space and a 'world of meanings and objects of thought which are
constituted in terms of those meanings'. Human spaces present themselves as
built on the basis of natural space." 65
Merleau-Ponty suggests here that the spaces that we give meaning to are inherently
rooted in the "mental space...of meanings and objects of thought" resting inside of us,
themselves a result of our embodied experience. There is thus an inner necessity to this
spatiality that seeks to "open onto an outside" that is the foundation for the desire to know
the outside world and inhabit other spaces and places. A dialectical co-constitution of this
kind will pose a problem for Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, however, that is reflective
of a problem in human thought about place in general and will open the doors to our
analysis of the experience of place.
In light of the above suggestions, the embodied experience of space can be read as
a precursor to our experience of geopolitics, as an extension of the self's experience of
the world. The very process through which we can appropriate spaces (the result of our
interaction with others in a shared life-world) is rooted in an act of intentional
consciousness that objectifies the autonomy of these spaces, making them shadows of our
lived-experiences. By shadows I mean the traces of meanings that arise when we ascribe
identities to particular spaces and places as we live through them, investing in them the
meanings we read in their horizons and landscapes. These shadows cling to our memories
of the world, constituting our identities and conceptions of reality, just as a veil falls over
a particular surface, or over the eyes of a stranger. In simpler terms, the spatial character
of human existence (embodied and directed towards the world), seeks to objectify and
65 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 294
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appropriate the invested meanings of lived-space (intentionality) and project them onto
the world as shadows of all lived-experiences - as concrete spaces, places of my own. To
say that human existence occurs in space is nothing new, but to suggest that there is a
quality to space that makes it the fundamental site of all creative endeavors (intellectual,
practical, and perhaps even geopolitical) reveals the radical potential of Merleau-Ponty's
phenomenological thesis. A key connection to the critical geopolitics constellation is thus
uncovered here by seeing the spatiality of the body as an instance of spatial self-
understanding, an understanding that paves the way for any form of geographic self-
understanding.
As intentionally conscious, however, what allows for the self to internalize the
spatial characteristics of objects in the world as part of its own experience of (being-in)
the world? That is to say, phenomenologically, what is it about the self that objectifies
and appropriates space and its objects, turning our experience of space and place into a
drive of domination? Merleau-Ponty suggests, by investigating our direct (intentional)
experience of being-in-the-world, that the features and qualities of sense experience (the
different ways we interpret and feel the "outside" world in which we are always
embedded) are never isolated phenomena that impress our consciousness, as traditional
empiricism would suggest. These experiences, as corporeal, are themselves "inserted into
a certain form of behavior," 66 suggesting that allegedly "external" phenomena, as stimuli
that are "integrated into a comprehensive situation," 67 are already anticipated and even
amplified by the body's experience of them. As a distinct experience, my typing these
66 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 208-09.
67 Ibid., p. 209.
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lines is far from being an isolated exercise in academic hair-splitting, but is itself
internalized into a particular lived-experience and set of objectives. Phenomena do not
simply occur onto the body of a person; this person is intimately involved in every aspect
of the phenomenon - not as passively facing it, but as Merleau-Ponty suggests, in
communion with it:
"The subject of sensation is neither a thinker who takes note of a quality, nor an
inert setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a power which is born into,
and simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or is synchronized
with it... [It] is nothing other than a certain way of being in the world suggested
to us from some point in space, and seized and acted upon my body...so that
sensation is literally a form of communion." 68
The phenomenological understanding of the sense of space challenges the modern
conceptions of mind and thought as self-standing, and of objects in the world as isolated
and impressive qualities, the very conceptions on which the modern subject is founded.
The self s immersion into lived-experience not only reveals that our understanding of the
world is one that is always situated in "a certain existential environment," but also that
this is a characteristic common to all lived-experience, common to all human beings and
their ways of understanding. The impersonal self (moi naturel), is one that "[finds] itself
already in a given situation, its powers already at work,"6 9 thus understands perception
and experience as ambiguous and as happening inside itself "on pergoit en moi," or
rather, "perception takes place in me."70
68 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 211-12.
69 Bannan, The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, p. 89.
70 Merleau-Ponty writes: "My perception, even when seen from the inside, expresses a given
situation: I can see blue because I am sensitive to colors, whereas personal acts create a situation:
I am a mathematician because I have decided to be one. So, if I wanted to render precisely the
perceptual experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me (on pergoit en moi), and not that I
47
The notion of experience as happening inside of myself has crucial implications
for the analysis in Chapter Three of place as something embedded in us. As Merleau-
Ponty suggests, to conceive of what we sense as heralding "a certain way of being in the
world suggested to us from some point in space," is to conceive of experience and actions
as always lived and situated in a given place and time. As something that "happens in us,"
this not only suggests a philosophical connection of fundamental importance, but also a
geographical and historical connection for our study of the geopolitical as a phenomenon
motivated by the sensation of a loss of place. These connections and constellations thus
begin to situate the understanding of the geopolitical as something existential and of
central relevance to the self; more importantly, I would suggest, they situate the
geopolitical as something that takes place inside the modern self Such a
phenomenological genealogy is thus reflective of a set of complications for the traditional
understanding of geopolitics and of the need for a renewed sense of responsibility to
place. The sense of responsibility to place, which informs the thought of both critical
geographers and phenomenologists, is rooted in a broader critique of the foundations of
modern subjectivity and its traditional intellectual disciplines. To demonstrate how the
geopolitical nature of thought informs both designs of power and attempts at resistance,
however, we must highlight what in our embodied experience of the world informs this
sense of responsibility. By demonstrating how our lived-experience of the world (as geo-
historical) allows us to enact a critical awareness of the interstices of geopolitics, we
must now highlight a place-in-between: a sense of responsibility that begins to "de-
perceive." See: Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 215 and Bannan, The
Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, p. 89.
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colonize" the Western project of Reason and attempts to make the study of geopolitics
and international relations transnational.
Lived-Experience and Geographical Responsibility
"...it is part of morality not to be at home in one's home."71
- Theodor Adorno
When Aristotle calls the human being a zoon politikon - a conception arising
from his understanding of the social unity between thought, place and language72 - he is
also thinking of the human in a particular place and the power of that place.73 For
Aristotle, place is prior to all things, "for place does not perish when the things in it cease
to be." 74 The primacy of Athens in his time, as the intellectual and political center of the
"civilized" world, was and remains for many, the first geo-historical manifestation of the
West's (first Greece, then Europe's) ultimate possibilities. The Athenian potential for
greatness was determined not only by Athens' place amongst the other Greek city-states,
but was in fact largely determined by its geo-economic (and intellectual) place and
dominance in the "Mediterranean" world at that particular historical moment. The
constitutive relationship between place, history and thought is at the center of what we
have been investigating, and is indicative of the existential dynamic of embodied
71 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections From Damaged Life, trans. by E. F. N. Jephcott
(London: Verso, 1984), p. 39.
72 F.M. Cornford, Before and After Socrates (Westford: Cambridge University Press, 1932), p. 89
73 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1997), p. ix
74 Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-
World, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 14; see also: Aristotle, Physics, Sect.
#208b, lines 35-209a, 2.
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existence. For Aristotle, Casey tells us, "where something is constitutes a basic
metaphysical category." 75 In light of the above analysis, the ability to point to things on a
map is reflective of an almost ontological capacity for determining and understanding
reality. Maps, unlike existence, are never ambiguous (or at least are never meant to be
so), they are manifestations of a certain understanding of history and space. As Rich
highlights above, maps are in fact reflective of a particular time and place, "a place in
history."76 Thus understood, conceptions and representations of space often act as a
layering of historical narratives, a geopolitical mapping of our own historical
understanding. As Susan Schulten points out, geography (both as a discipline and real-
world practice) is historically constitutive:
"This power of geography to shape history is difficult to apprehend, and even
more difficult to document systematically. But the elusive and reciprocal nature
of this interplay should not deter us from investigating its implications for the
historical enterprise ... We can never ... reach 'beyond geography', for it is
impossible to imagine the world outside of its interpretive conventions. But we
can ask how geography has mediated the world for us, and how it has concretized
the abstract."7 7
Human existence is always already situated and (as embodied) it is always already
involved in the ways we understand and experience the world and its places: the self is
always already a geographical self The experience and reflection of place (the existential
basis of geographic self-understanding) not only demands that we continually re-enact
the spatiality of human existence (as intentional towards place), but also that we trace the
origins of that enactment, or as Schulten suggests, "how we have concretized the
75 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 50. See also: Aristotle, Categories, Sect. #2al, lines 5a9-14. My
italics.
76 Adrienne Rich, "Notes Towards a Politics of Location," in Blood, Bread and Poetry, p. 27.
77 Susan Schulten, The Geographical Imagination in America, p. 241.
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abstract." Geopolitics, as an extension of the human desire to be in place, to inhabit and
know many places, "understands" itself as a geography-at-work, perpetually re-enacting
a way of being and way of knowing that inform its internal logic, simultaneously writing
its path onto the landscapes from which it attains "self-understanding." Geopolitics writes
space, as it lives space; it makes its own actions and mappings (as material and situated)
eternally susceptible to new readings and thus new ways of writing - geopolitics is
always in excess of itself
Spatial constructions like maps, as means of containment and marginalization,
create before us a world where there is no "state-to-state" conflict as such, but rather an
interaction that is reflective of historical legacies and narratives of ontological
manipulation. Because they are historical, these constructions have a situated and
communal effect on reality; because they are manipulations of places (active
engagements) they exhort us to respond. As Matthew Sparke suggests, ingrained in the
very nature of geography - as a personal dimension (constituted-by and constitutive-of
human identity) and as an academic discipline concerned with interpreting the
"negotiated frames of references" of socio-cultural and political space - there exists
representational "feedback loops": constructed representations that are geo-historically
informed by the way people think, understand and posit geographies of and in the
international system.78 Sparke suggests that our imagination not only feeds our
approaches towards spaces and places (echoing Santiago's understanding of critical
78 Matthew Sparke, "The World is Not Flat: From Bad Geographies of Globalization to the
Mountains Beyond Mountains," Broad Educational Series lecture given at Florida International
University on March 1 4 th, 2007.
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space), but also that, in producing the ideas that color our view of the world, our
imagination tries to, as Tuan suggests above, "[seek] meaning in order," and "[seek]
meaning in the landscape."79
In both academic approaches and practices of everyday life, Sparke suggests that
there exists a particular geography of vocalization, a prose of the world: a type of
enunciation that rises from a particular geo-historical context that provides the fagade of
an allegedly given stability (even as visibly unstable!) to the order of geographic and
geopolitical designs. 80 The construction of places is thus ultimately defined by the
embodied and lived-experiences we as individuals go through, by how we affect place
and how place affects us. Given the complexities of modernity, however, the perception
of space and place is of a much different nature than the understanding of the pre-
reflective we have outlined so far. Sparke suggests that the narratives and veils that
define the international order (or disorder) we live in are built on the particular
experiences and histories of established world powers. Not only is the enunciation that
arises from this order one that is geopolitically totalizing, it is also a type of enunciation
that seeks to silence (intellectually, as well as materially) other rival voices of dissent or
resistance: geopolitics is always a geopolitics of knowledge.
Like geography, geopolitics writes space in order to become self-referential, self-
sufficient, and thus self-understanding. Since reality may often reflect otherwise,
geopolitical desires can never be fully satisfied and are thus always-at-work. The point
for Sparke about a critical understanding of geography begins with seeing geography as a
79 Yi-Fu Tuan, "Geography, Phenomenology and the Study of Human Nature," p. 184.
80 Sparke, "The World is Not Flat..."
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form of earth-writing, where we are exhorted to think beyond the writerly concern with
"the ways in which books, travel guides, poetry and the like, evoke and contribute to the
construction of particular landscapes," to a more fundamental criticism:
"The more radical and far-reaching implication of the argument that the 'geo' is
constantly being 'graphed' is that any assumption about geography either as a
result of or as a basis or container for other social relations always risks
fetishizing a particular spatial arrangement and ignoring ongoing processes of
spatial production, negotiation, or contestation."8 1
Just as embodied existence is always dynamic and ambiguous to itself, geography and
geopolitics must constantly renew themselves and their representations of durability in
order to remain effective. The material "concreteness" of the world (along with the
fallacy of self-sufficiency that it invests into the human subject) not only gives
geopolitical designs an existential character that informs our everyday practices, but also
reveals within the geopolitical an existential ambiguity that simultaneously affects critical
and anti-geopolitical endeavors. This ambiguity about geography and the geopolitical,
which is reflective of the ambiguity of the human self, risks turning critical spaces into
the reproduction of foundationally-fixed ideas about the nature of places. 82 Such a
"metaphysics of geo-presence," by privileging certain spatial patterns, "simultaneously
[downplays] the geographic diversity of the constitutive processes that produced it."83 In
clearer terms, Sparke suggests that the geopolitical nature of thought is dangerously
unstable to be treated under traditional approaches, even of the most critical kind, thus
engaging in a deconstruction of the critical that leads to the interstices of thought itself.
81 Matthew Sparke, In The Space of Theory: Postfoundational Geographies of the Nation-State
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. xiv.
82 Ibid., p. xv.
83 Ibid., p. xxix.
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By drawing on Gayatri Spivak's anti-colonial reading of Jacques Derrida,8 4
Sparke's deconstructive geography seeks to read the "shadows of geographical patterns"
that lie dormant and implicit in thinking about the geographical and the geopolitical. He
suggests that only a responsible reading that lies somewhere in the space of theory (but
whose space: Bernstein's, Santiago's, Merleau-Ponty's or Sparke's?), "a spur to respond
ethically to the erasures represented by any particular geography... a call to map
persistently without totalization or finalization,"8 5 can adequately acknowledge the limits
of geographical thinking and address the geopolitical nature of thought, subjecting both
to a critique that begins at the margins of thought:
"Every geography... every mapping, picturing, visualization, landscaping,
theorization, and metaphorization of space becomes re-readable in this sense not
just for what it includes, but also for what it overwrites and covers up in the
moment of representing spatially the always already unfinished historical-
geographical process and power relations of its spatial production." 86
The notion of geographical responsibility thus seeks to uncover the "anemic
geographies" that lie dormant in all of geography; similar to the present study, Sparke
wants to reveal what is geopolitical in all thinking as part of a reminder of responsibility
towards all theorizing. 87 What remains fundamental in his analysis is the critical place-in-
between from which responsibility emerges and casts forth its critique: as existentially
situated, it is historically dynamic; as historically and genealogically intentioned, it is
never-ending - it is a part of the phenomenological project par excellence. The sense of
84 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Translator's Preface," in Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology,
trans. by G.C. Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) pp. ix-lxxxviii
85 Sparke, In The Space of Theory, p. xvi.
86 Ibid., p. xvi.
87 Ibid., pp. xvi-xvii.
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an ethical geography, he therefore suggests, "is not therefore a humanist position that
assumes the geographer's or anti-essentialist philosopher's ability to 'choose'
responsibility individualistically, nor is it a religious responsibility of moral duty."88
Rather, it leaves us only with what Spivak calls the "freedom to acknowledge insertion
into responsibility," 89 the embodied im-placement of the human self.
For Spivak, the acknowledgement of insertion is indicative of both the intentional
nature of embodied existence and of the ambiguous "freedom" of the
phenomenologically understood self: it is a concern with the lived-coexistence and
injustice that forms our everyday lives. Its more radical implications, the concern with
those people in history that "are no longer here," makes several connections with post-
colonial and liberation strands of thought emerging from the developing world and the
concerns of those on the underside of history. Yet Spivak's and Sparke's analyses do not
go far enough, remaining nevertheless within the confines of a geographical self that has
already had the opportunity to speak her voice, a self that is activating her own critical
space and enacting a geopolitical awareness of the world. In many ways, which they
would be quick to acknowledge, and which my project itself is guilty of, this is reflective
of the problem of all thought in general: understanding is always doomed to exclusivity
and failure; total comprehension and inclusion are never possible from our situated ways
of understanding and being. Yet Spivak and Sparke hint at several key notions that
propose to broaden and enact this ethical responsibility. Without the hubris of founding
88 Sparke, In The Space of Theory, p. xxxi.
89 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Thinking Academic Freedom in Gendered Postcoloniality (Cape
Town: University of Cape Tow Press, 1992), p. 7.
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new, all-encompassing theoretical systems, and driven instead by the impetus to de-
colonize discussion of these concerns, they invoke what philosopher Enrique Dussel
considers the geopolitical origins of philosophy:
"Philosophy ponders the non-philosophical: the reality. But because it involves
reflection on its own reality, it sets out from what already is, from its own world,
its own system, its own space. The philosophy that has emerged from a periphery
has always done so in response to a need to situate itself with regard to a center -
in total exteriority."90
Philosophy is always existentially embodied in philosophers: those situated in a particular
place, with a particular experience and understanding of space and place. Philosophical
thinking is only real in expression; it is through expression that it seeks to write out a
space for itself in the world, manifesting its place on the horizon of thought. To take
geopolitical space seriously, Dussel suggests, a critical geo-historical awareness is thus
necessary that not only seeks to forge a critical space where, "The slave, in revolt, uses
the master's language," 91 but must also first recognize that it has always done so on the
fringes of philosophy:
"Distant thinkers, those who had a perspective of the center from the periphery,
those who had to define themselves in the presence of an already established
image of the human person and in the presence of uncivilized fellow humans, the
newcomers, the ones who hope because they are always outside, these are the
ones who have a clear mind for pondering reality...Philosophical intelligence is
never so truthful, clean, and precise as when it starts from oppression and does
not have to defend any privileges, because it has none." 92
For Dussel (like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sparke), philosophical thinking and
study always take place on the horizons of a certain pre-reflective experience of the world
90 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p. 3.
91 Ibid., "Preface".
92 Ibid., p. 4. My italics.
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that varies from place to place. The fact that "places are in me" (embodied im-placement)
clearly affects how I engage the world: places can limit or broaden the horizons of my
experience. My brief invocation of Dussel thus acts as a prelude to the following chapter
where the geopolitical nature of thought will be discussed in the context of the West's
geopolitical origins and the development of the modern subject's understanding of place.
"Thought that takes refuge in the center," Dussel writes, "ends by thinking it to be the
only reality." 93 Thought, as inherently geopolitical, becomes self-referential and absolute
when it thinks its context as concrete and unchanging, when it assumes its power as total
and thus the only alternative. Just as for Sparke and Spivak, Dussel's task of an "ethical
philosophy," of an ethical hermeneutics, is "to describe the ethical structure that the
human being lives in its historical, common, and unreflected situation." 94 As Michael
Barber reminds us, and Dussel maintains, "humanity does not arbitrarily construct this
[situation] and its demands, but, rather, finds being with its accompanying prescriptions
imposed." 95 In light of the self's ethical implacement, to understand geopolitics is thus to
understand it from the outside and from within: it is to already be living the geopolitical
on the inside (as part of our thought) as well as on the outside (of its designing core).
Such a geo-historical awareness is one that critical approaches to geopolitics are
implicitly informed by, but which curiously remains on the margins of their writings.
93 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p. 4
94 See: Enrique Dussel, Para una dtica de la liberacidn Latinoamericana, 5 vols., (Buenos Aires:
Siglo Veintiuno Argentina Editores, 1973), Vol. 1, p. 38, 56; Vol. 2, pp. 135-38, 143-45, 151, and
182.
95 Michael Barber, Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of
Liberation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), p. 33.
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As I will discuss in Chapter Three, the central difficulty of Western designs of
national identity is that they assume of places to be empty recipients (containers) of
constructions foreign to their experiences and ultimate realities. What these discourses
and designs frequently encourage is the often-violent rejection and disavowal of imposed
structures and practices - actions that conversely eclipse the possibility of fruitful,
"analogical" engagement from all actors. The eclipsing of places, bodies and ways of
thinking that energize these geopolitical designs thus attempts to weaken and silence the
identities and power of particular places. The traces that these practices leave are not only
harmful to the realities and development of those places and people that receive them, but
are ultimately limiting the ways these places may be formative to individuals outside of
them and the ways states can "learn" from each other. It takes a peculiar "in-between"
strategy to overcome and re-think these imposed designs, a strategy that both translates
the inadequacies of geopolitical discourse and emancipates the voices inside.
Sparke's analysis of geographical responsibility reveals a set of critiques that tie
to the broader constellation of critical thought in Dussel's own calls for geo-historical
awareness. As I have shown, his deconstructive analysis in fact elucidates the
geopolitical basis that underlies Dussel's call for Latin American liberation: geographical
responsibility is always already on the fringes of mainstream thought and must never
seek to finalize its intentions. It is thus necessary at this point to describe the nature of the
geopolitical place-in-between from which Dussel is writing, a place, he suggests, that lies
on the margins of geopolitics and modernity. In Chapter Three, I will explore the
phenomenological origins of the West's understanding of place and how its historical
development has transformed ideas of national identity into a strategic geopolitics of
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security. By elaborating the phenomenological understanding of embodied consciousness
and the human experience of place as found in the writings of Edward Casey and his
understanding of habitus, I will show how the re-enactment of the experience of place is
a fundamental part of the modern subject's sense of reality and continuity. Such a sense
of self is implicit in the writing and practice of U.S. foreign policy and in turn leads to a
politicized understanding of the human body, the body of the state, and the body of
history in the attempt at constructing a securitized identity.
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Chapter III: Self and Place in the Geopolitics of Security
"Power bears a halo about it, and its curse... is to fail to see
the image of itself it shows to others."
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty
I have up to this point taken great liberties in my general definition and
understanding of geopolitics. In many ways, I have perhaps said things that certain
geopolitical discourses (classical as well as contemporary) would object to as legitimate
factors in the study and understanding of geopolitics. Rather than being an obstacle,
displacing the general understanding of geopolitics is an objective of my work: the
insistence of discourses (mainstream or critical) to understand the geopolitical solely at
the representational level reveals the potential of these designs to be seen merely as
political responses to certain material conditions of the international system. By failing to
recognize the rooted and situated (existential) nature of geopolitical designs and thought,
we fail to recognize the prolonged psychological and epistemic effects of these designs
on everyday life, affecting both our intellectual identity and understanding of the world.
To be clear, a reading of geopolitics at the level of its manifest, material representations
(even when critical of its designs and structures of power) must first recognize that it is
fundamentally already part of these designs, that is to say, as a product (by association,
origins, or response) of their historical development. The self-conscious recognition on
the part of critical approaches to philosophy and geopolitics towards the totalizing
practices of geopolitical designs is in fact part of a much broader debate concerning our
ideas of modern thought and history.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 216.
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As Louiza Odysseos argues, modern political thought rests on a logic of
composition that has read its political and historical development as distinct from the
materiality of the places it has occurred in. Intertwined with the spread of a solipsistic
understanding of the human self, this logic of composition has led us to forget how the
idea of a self is at all possible:
"Based on modern subjectivity, with its key features of self-sufficiency and
mastery prescribing a relation of mere copresence, the logic of composition
suggests that units or entities are nonrelational in their constitution until
'composed.' This determination of coexistence, however, does not arise from the
phenomena, the facticity of entities; rather, it is based on an interpretive
preconception...the nonrelational subject, whose ontological attributes render
coexistence as a secondary and fragile condition [the state? the social contract?],
as an act of composing previously unrelated and preformed subjects."2
Through a logic of composition, both the heterogeneous and social nature of the human
self as based on coexistence, as well as the connection to place that makes all
philosophical expression possible, have been eclipsed and distorted by the presence and
weight of an omniscient and universal subject. Rather than reading history as the dynamic
development and interaction of a broader body of peoples, ideas and experiences, modern
philosophy has traditionally subsumed history to the development of this allegedly
sovereign, self-sufficient, and universal ego. Yet the reified conception of the subject did
not arise from the confines of Descartes' stove-heated room, but rather from the
experiences of European exchange, conflict and "discovery" that informed modern
philosophical and political thought from the end of the Middle Ages to the
Enlightenment. Such a conception of reality - this ontology of world history - is at the
center of the Eurocentric conception of place, thought and international relations that we
seek to understand and displace. As Enrique Dussel suggests:
2 Louiza Odysseos, The Subject of Coexistence, p. xxvii.
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"That ontology did not come from nowhere. It arose from a previous experience
of domination over other persons, of cultural oppression over other worlds.
Before the ego cogito there is an ego conquiro; 'I conquer" is the practical
foundation of 'I think."' 3
We thus find that the development of modern history, as understood by the Eurocentrism
of modern philosophy, has first rested on the material expansion and appropriation of
other peoples and places (ego conquiro), before the philosophical appropriation of reality
(ego cogito).4 More than solely expansion, however, the alleged grandeur of European
thought and politics has rested on the self-understanding of its endeavors as
representative of the history of humanity and of "truly modern" thinking. By resting on
the principles of discovery and rationality in order to explain and justify its expansion
into "new" worlds, the understanding of modern philosophy allows us to see, in living
color, what Schulten calls, "the power of geography to shape history."5 Yet how did we
get to this place and moment of history? What is it about the European experience of
itself, of the world, and ultimately of place, that leads to conceiving of thought as
necessarily resting on territorial expansion? How is this conception at the very root and
origin of what is formally called today national security and geopolitics? The answer to
these questions, as we will explore in this chapter, rests on a certain experience and
understanding of place that is common to everyday human thought before ever becoming
policy and state design.
3 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p. 3.
4 Ibid., pp. 3-4. For a similar perspective on this facet of history, see also: Michel Foucault,
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and
Interviews, ed. by D.F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 142 and 150.
5 Susan Schulten, The Geographical Imagination in America, p. 241
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According to the phenomenology of place found in the work of Edward Casey,
modern forms of thought act as the manifestation of the expansion of place through the
human practice of habitation. Such practices make place not only the site where the
geopolitical plays out, but indeed the very means through which the geopolitical is
possible. By exploring the human experience of place, we will find in Casey's analyses
the tools to understand the role of place in the formation of what we can call a
geographical self, but also in the formation of epistemic boundaries that form the
embryos of our modern boundaries of territorial and national security. These boundaries,
I will argue, lie somewhere between the condition of habitus and its expansion into
geopolitics, and are at the center of the phenomenological understanding of geopolitics as
an extension of the philosophical subject of modernity.
Between Geography and Philosophy: The Ethos of Place
Edward Casey's phenomenology attempts to understand our relation to place as a
necessary component of our lived-experience and a category of the understanding. Both
how we experience places and how they affect us, he maintains, have been forgotten and
eclipsed from the collective experience of human existence by the disarray of
philosophical abstraction.6 Such a condition is reflective of what contemporary
philosophers have ambiguously called the post-modern condition.7 More concretely, this
6 See: Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place.
' We should not read the term post-modern merely in a temporal sense, but more in a hybrid one.
Post-modernity, according to just one of its many observers, is the present condition where social
and existential knowledge has lost its traditional stability and monolithic standing in Western
society and thought. In relation to the technological and material developments of capitalism and
the modern world, knowledge has lost its place at the center of contemporary social discourses,
taking a backseat to the mass construction, distribution and consumption of prefabricated forms
of being. In short, knowledge in post-modernity has become a commodity to be sold and imposed
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kind of condition is a correlate of the dispersion and instability that the social phenomena
of modernity have historically and presently leveled onto our self-understanding and
experience of place. 8 To understand such a dispersion, Casey maintains we need to "re-
find place" and reaffirm it as a "clearing" where philosophy and geography can meet.9
By calling for a phenomenological genealogy of place, Casey focuses on how our
understanding of place has changed and become displaced across history - in many ways,
he suggests, place is something "we have already always been losing."10 He maintains
that in order to return to place, to re-affirm its central character in human experience, "we
may need to return, if not in actual fact then in memory or imagination, to the very
earliest places we have known."" For our intents and purposes, to speak of returning to
place not only means, to paraphrase Gramsci, to make an inventory of history's "infinity
of traces"' 2 in us, but also to redefine our place in the world as human beings in general.
The return to place is ultimately a re-thinking of human experience. Casey's exhortation
is one that asks us not only to reflect on our practices in space and place, but also on the
ways we remember and imagine these as well, suggesting a critical awareness of the
on a public by dominant structures of power. See: Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
8 Edward S. Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy: What Does it Mean to Be in the Place-
World," in Annals of the Association of American Geographers (vol. 91, no. 4, December, 2001),
p. 683
9 Ibid.
10 Casey, Getting Back Into Place, p. x
" Ibid.
12 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From The Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers,
1971), p. 324.
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everyday "negotiated frames of reference" that critical geographers such as Gregory and
O Tuathail have informed us about, as well as a sense of geographical responsibility
similar to that proposed by Sparke and Dussel.
The critical awareness of place not only builds off of Merleau-Ponty's own
conception of the body and of lived-space, but is also an understanding that presents us
with a more comprehensive description of the dynamics of place and embodied existence,
a conception that sees the existence of human beings and place in communion:
"Your immediate placement [in the world] - or "implacement," as I prefer to call
it - counts for much more than is usually imagined. More, for instance, than
serving as a mere backdrop for concrete actions or thoughts. Place itself is
concrete and at one with action and thought."' 3
Casey attempts here to reveal an anthropological dimension to our situated understanding
of place that he calls "the geographical self," where "place is regarded as constitutive of
one's sense of identity."' 4 As the formal construction of an insight that geographers have
been previously aware of, Casey's insight had only been dealt with at the level of
geographic understanding and not of the human self's constitutive experience of this
relation. As geographer Robert Sack reminds us, "place and self help construct and
activate each other...the formation of personality [is] directly connected to the formation
of place."' 5
13 See: Casey, Getting Back Into Place, p. xiii. This description suggests a fundamental praxis at
work in our experience of place: "The im- of implacement stresses the action of getting in or into,
and it carries connotations of immanence that are appropriate to the inhabitation of places." See:
Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 315, n. 9.
14 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 684.
R .D. Sack, Homo Geographicus: A Framework for Action, Awareness and Moral Concern,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 88.
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Following a long line of phenomenological and geographical thinking concerning
the intimate relation between human beings and the places they inhabit, Casey attempts to
conceive of a critical space-in-between that reveals how existential, social and political
meanings are constituted and interpreted by means of the embodied self's exposure and
appropriation of space. In clearer terms, by positing place as a "concrete" component of
action and thought, as a fundamental characteristic of the embodied human self, Casey
highlights in human beings a geo-historical dimension that makes their encounter with
place central to their existence. It is now the concreteness of place, much more than the
existential possibilities of lived-space, that lies at the core of the human experience of the
world. Such a critical space, as an understanding between geography and philosophy, in
addition to making connections with critical methods of thought mentioned in Chapter
Two, also has profound implications for the existential appropriation of geopolitics that I
have been seeking to uncover. The sense of this appropriation can be described as an
epistemic veiling: the psychological appropriation of a residue of geometrical space as a
latent, spatial landscaping or writing; more clearly, it concerns the layering and
structuring of natural spaces with the veil of subjective understanding.1 6
In part, an existential appropriation is a central element in the "constitution" and
pre-reflective understanding of place' 7; that is to say, appropriating a place of my own is
16 A description more akin to what I callfilm-phenomenology, veiling refers to the processes by
which objects acquire meaning for us according to how they have affected us; that is to say, it is
concerned with the intentional character (the uses and objectives) of forms of representation,
particularly film, through which cultural, political and ideological meanings are "transmitted,"
taking shape in my eyes through the affects they have laid over me. See: Mauro J. Caraccioli,
"Film-Phenomenology and the Veiling of Knowledge," (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of
the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, in Pittsburgh, PA on October 1 6th-
1 8t", 2008.)
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key to forming a geographical self.18 By capturing a residue, however, I also mean that
this is only the partial appropriation of that quality of space (as lived-space) that makes
up all possible horizons of human existence for me.19 As a quality that remains
anonymous and available to all, I can appropriate only small parts of space to name and
call places of my own, always in an ontologically limited fashion. Like a sea around and
inside us, space and place coincide in the pre-reflective through our embodied experience
of them; they are fundamentally linked to us in an intricate tapestry of embodied
consciousness and signification, a communal structuring and laying out of the world
(Auslegung2 0 ) and also of ourselves. We ascribe meaning to space and place, just as they
inscribe meaning in us. As Casey suggests, "By being in place, we find ourselves in what
is subsistent and enveloping,"2' reaffirming the intentional character of human experience
17 It is important to remember that for Merleau-Ponty and Casey, places and the objects "within"
them can never be fully appropriated and grasped. As Bannan reminds us, "The perceptual
consciousness from which [the subject] emerges is both anonymous [commonly-shared]...and
partial: the object I perceive is never all that there is to perceive, nor is the sense by means of
which I perceive it, all of myself, the perceiver. Each particular sense is a sort of specialized self,
an explicit involvement in a particular object standing out against the background of my general
involvement in the world that animates... [its] general context." See: Bannan, The Philosophy of
Merleau-Ponty, pp. 89-90.
18 It is fair to note here that the experience of place comes prior to, or remains outside, the formal
cartography of the state. Indeed, the argument will be made further down that once a person or
group of peoples has been corralled in (or out) of the territorial categories and processes of the
state, their experience of place has become ontologically usurped and / or negated - this marks
the thinning-out of life itself. For a key source, see: Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign
Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998)
19 See: Bannan, p. 89; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 87; and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, The Nature: Course Notes from the College de France, compiled by Dominique
Seglard and trans. by Robert Vallier, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003).
20 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970), pp. 137-41.
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as occurring in space and place, but also taking place inside me (sedimentation). As an
attitude towards the world, such an appropriation not only affects our sense of self, but it
also affects our sense of others. What is there to say then about the appropriation of the
intentional qualities of space and place for geopolitical practices? What is it about the
existential appropriation of geopolitics that remains fundamental to the geographical
self s experience of the world and its places?
Habitudes of the Self and the Experience of Place
The limits of intentional consciousness on our appropriation of the world (of
objects, others, places) are only limits in the ways that we understand our
phenomenological relation to place; that is to say, they are only limits when we
understand the limits of thought and of the human self as embodied and coexisting with
others. Geopolitical thinking seeks to constantly rupture these limits on its own being by
acts "perceived" and intended as essential to its becoming. In a phenomenological sense,
geopolitics (like existence) is always in excess of itself. Geopolitics inverts the primacy
of perception with the primacy of reason; where perception limits our awareness of the
world to a state of mutuality, modern reason broadens it into a state of comprehension
and totality. The ambiguity that Merleau-Ponty ascribes to both our experience of the
world and of others (the ambiguity between being subject and object), is an ontological
limit on our experience and understanding of the world that conceives the very nature of
existence as indeterminate. 2 Such a limit does not mean that existence is non-sense, but
21 Casey, Getting Back Into Place, p. xvii
22 As Merleau-Ponty writes, "Existence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental
structure, and in so far as it is the very process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes on
meaning...in so far as it is the taking up of a de facto situation. We shall give the name
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rather that it is never stable: it possesses a dynamic that allows us to understand that we
have the possibility of many meanings, all of which are necessarily rooted in "certain
bases of coherence, such as involvement in a single world or the sedimentation of
experience."2 3
Geopolitical thinking, however, displaces these core "bases of coherence" by
conflating the possibilities of lived-space with the appropriation (sedimentation) of the
residues of place. Geopolitics, as Paul Virilio would suggest, "inflates the present," 24
giving primacy to an absolute, self-sufficient and panoptic ego, isolating the self from its
existential involvement in the world.25 The politicization of places and of the self, the
mind-frame of classic European colonialism, thus eclipses and scatters the poesis (the
communal creation) of existence, hijacking its ontological potential into an instance and
function of individual power. Places, therefore, no longer contain, or hold any meanings
- they become increasingly porous and easily reshaped, so long as we conceive of them
as such. Such a process does not merely go without saying, but is rather part of the
dispersion of the narratives that have historically given places a sense of community, that
it is to say, it unsettles the very premises of modernity that have allowed groups of
peoples to establish a sense of identity into nations and states, differentiating these from
the unfamiliarity of "the international." 26
transcendence to this act in which existence takes up, for its own purposes, and transforms such a
situation." See: Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 169
23 Bannan, The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, p. 80. My italics.
24 Paul Virilio, Open Sky, trans. by J. Rose (London: Verso, 1997), p. 135.
25 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 684.
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The dispersion of the geo-historical sense of identity, part and parcel of the
condition of post-modernity we mentioned above, not only empties places of historical
meaning through a gospel of competition, speed, and consumption, but also empties
human beings of the capacity to recognize the very qualities that allow them to come
together in the first place.27 For Casey, this "thinning-out" of place eliminates the
"enmeshed infrastructures" between place and self that determine the intentional
character (towards-which, for-which) of our experience of the world and others. 28 In
other words, the collapse of place correlates "with a self of infinite distractibility whose
own surface is continually complicated by new pleasures," 29 perhaps even a desire for
new places. Following Casey, a conception of a geopolitics of knowledge would
therefore be one where a certain understanding of place and history, itself geo-historically
situated, tempts us to see its history and myths as our own, developing as a structure of
dominance which acts as a veil over our experience and understanding. As Sack suggests,
"thinned-out places work well when they do not intrude on our consciousness and thus
allow us to attend to the things that should take place in the world," making a routine out
26 This sense of inside and outside is central to the study of international relations, and its
exclusionary power is a key element of contemporary, critical perspectives. See: R.B.J. Walker,
Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993)
27 In contrast to Hardt and Negri's assertion that post-modern dispersion and fragmentation are
key elements for a renewed mobilization of people, Casey's phenomenology maintains that
"where we are," and perhaps more importantly "who we are," are not only co-extensive with the
durability of place, but as I will argue in Chapter Three, are a privilege that has been historically
denied and frustrated to the peoples of the developing world through the Euro-American
(colonial) assertion of place-bound identity. See: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude:
War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005) pp. 208-11 and
Casey, Getting Back into Place, p. xiii.
28 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 684
29 Ibid., p. 685
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of complex life.30 The character of this "should," however, is left unquestioned by Sack,
even as he suggests in an earlier passage that, "thinned-out places with permeable
boundaries help us see through the veils of culture."3 How is this "should" enacted? In
what ways is this "should" politicized by particular actors and interests?
According to Casey, the intentional character of place tests the self and its ways
of (self) understanding. The more leveled places are, he argues, the more the self seeks
thickness and thus enrichment, intensifying a desire for the real, a desire for habitus.32
The term habitus is borrowed from the work of Pierre Bourdieu33 and is used as a
mediating term between place and self. Habitus (the bodily character and disposition of
habitation) is an improvisational and innovative quality of human existence that (through
embodied consciousness) remains open to the material and intellectual potentialities of
existence. 34 Habitus is "always enacted in a particular place and incorporates the features
inherent in previous such places,"35 indicating a sedimentation of places in the self. As a
habitude, a relational attitude towards the world and others, habitus is the embodied basis
of action in any sphere and any place, lying somewhere between lived-space and the
geographical self. Habitudes, Casey goes on, "incorporate and continue...what one has
30 Sack, Homo Geographicus, p. 138
31 Ibid.
32 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 685
33 See: Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. by R. Nice, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977)
34 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 686
3 Ibid.
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experienced in particular places,"36 creating a sense of home-place,37 a place of "ready-
to-hand" involvement, always intentional to others and the world (towards-which, for-
which). Habitudes are already there when we are inculcated into the world, instructing us,
as Bourdieu says, with "the structures constitutive of a particular type of environment." 38
If we follow this line of reasoning carefully - if habitus is a condition that allows
us to connect identity and place, to connect history and geography as geo-historicity - we
find that the thinning-out of places that is characteristic of post-modernity is the thinning-
out of habitus itself. It is, in Casey's words, "the replacement of one set of habitudes
[engaging with dense places] with another set," focused on flattened or perhaps even
flattening places.3 9 Paying close attention to the phenomenological genealogy we have
been drawing out, it is clear to see here that geopolitical actions are thus based on a
disintegration of the phenomenological understanding of knowledge and existence, a
distortion that relapses thought back to the modern Hobbesian, Cartesian, and Lockean
subject of Western modernity - sovereign, self-sufficient, and universal. In modern
international thought, this action replaces the desire for a place of my own, with a desire
for more places - it is an action reflective of a drive for security and spatial sovereignty.
36 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 686.
3 This is a similar account to Heidegger's description of the work-place. See: Martin Heidegger,
Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row), p. 100.
38 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, p. 72.
39 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 686.
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Of Habitus and Security: Re-Situating the Geopolitical
"Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action
or event from which it is said to derive."40
- David Campbell
The connection between place and security can be found by addressing the
intentional effects of habitus on the psychological dispositions of embodied human
existence. "Human beings," Casey writes, "act on the basis of habitus,"41 maintaining that
the value and essence of habitus lies in its actuality, on the enactment of a present
expressing an intentional commitment to a place-world. In its performance, habitus
"reaches out to place, a being or becoming in place."42 The intentional character of
habitus needs human selves in order to reenact its habitudinal bonds, investing in the
geographical self the intentional desire for more places in order to reenact the habitudes
informing its everyday practices. It is this reaching out that is of interest for us, both at
the individual and state level: does not a place "understand" the fulfillment of its being
(fulfill its becoming) in its geopolitical designs? Habitation thus understood (along with a
subsequent process of social and historical habituation) is the means through which the
geographical self "realizes its active commitment to place," 43 and through which states in
the international system articulate their spatial sovereignty as part of a national identity
narrative.
40 David Campbell, Writing Security, p. 2.
41 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 687.
42 Ibid.
43 As Casey reminds us, habitation is enacted through our bodies and the schemes they activate,
dwelling in a particular place and concretizing our habitudes, investing in us (as the Latin root
habere shows), a desire "to have [and] to hold." See: Ibid.
73
The question of identity takes us from the realm of material circumstances to the
epistemic and ideational structures that emerge from this condition. By reflecting the
habitudes that are a result of our embodied experience of place, ideas also "inhabit"
places, "having" these in our epistemic grasp (veiling). To inhabit occurs through both
my body (perception, action) and mind (memory, understanding), and as Casey reminds
us, these modes express the durability of habitus.44 As both performative and transitive,
however, to inhabit a place can weaken the crucial awareness of the engagement between
place and self. The phenomenological nature of geopolitics (particularly of a geopolitics
of knowledge) thus reveals the desire of human beings in place to express power and
dominance as an extension of the rational desire to expand habitus and perpetuate a
situated mode of seeing and understanding the world. Geopolitics is existential in that it
reflects (and affects) the basic human desire to have and hold a place, conflating habitus
with the idea of spatial sovereignty.
The desire to replicate and prolong my experience of place (in fact, the desire to
keep this experience sovereign from usurpation) informs the collective drives to carve out
a "common place" in the world according to my habitudinal understanding of reality.
This is the desire that lies at the center of identity narratives that invest in groups of
people a sense of a "common place" for their collective experiences and practices45 - the
"activity in passivity" of habitus46.
as As Casey writes, habitus expands "so as to prolong what I experience beyond the present
moment." See: Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 687
as For a study on the relationship between literacy and the representation of national identity, see:
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991)
46 Casey, "How To Get From Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time," p. 25.
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"If habitus represents a movement from the externality of established customs and
norms to the internality of durable dispositions, habitation is a matter of re-
externalization - of taking the habitus that has been acquired and continually re-
enacting it in the place-world." 47
Only as expanding and re-externalized can a geopolitical vision express its discursive
commitment to the writing of space and place. This only occurs, however, after these
designs, practices and beliefs have been internalized.48 The sedimentation of experience
and of places thus becomes a process of "writing" that is inscribed on human individuals
as part of habitation's social tenacity. In the context of communities and states, the
process of sedimentation reaches its apogee through the nationalist (or even
internationalist) expressions found in maps, film, and popular culture, reenacting the
movement of habitus and the tenacity of spatial sovereignty through the internalization of
the writing of space. We have been taught to believe that place and self are existentially
divorced from each other, a veil that has nevertheless given primacy to the interests of
states and the subject of Western modernity. By highlighting these characteristics,
Casey's conception of place and habitus posits a critical space-in-between understanding
of geopolitics49 that leaves us with a sense of the interaction (inter-subjectivity) of place-
47 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 687. My italics.
48 See, for instance, Halford Mackinder's infamous 1907 lecture, "On Thinking Imperially,"
where he maintains that the principal problem of renewing the British Empire lay in "the
difficulty of picturing the idea of the Empire." As O Tuathail suggests, this was more than an
intellectual goal, but a bureaucratic one intended for the whole of society: "Our aim must be to
make our whole people think Imperially - think that is to say in spaces that are world wide - and
to this end our geographical teaching should be addressed." See: Halford Mackinder, "On
Thinking Imperially," in Lectures on Empire, ed. M.E. Sadler, (London: Privately printed, 1907),
pp. 32, 38; cited in: O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, pp. 88-9.
49 Edward Soja poses a similar conception of geographical existence that makes the interaction of
place and thought "a knowable and unknowable, real and imagined life-world of experiences,
emotions, events and political choices that is existentially shaped by...the transformation of
(spatial) knowledge into (spatial) action in a field of unevenly developed (spatial) power." See:
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worlds. Such an interaction also highlights a place-in-between: an understanding of the
geopolitical that transcends the inscription of domination and resistance, seeking instead
a geo-historical engagement that liberates our understanding from invasive and
exclusionary strategies.
Casey's understanding of habitus, despite its insights into the tenacity of place
and the malleability of habitus, only hints at the effects that "expanding places" may have
on human beings and the ways that geopolitical practices and actions condition (and are
conditioned by) the body's interaction in a given place or set of places.50 At the epistemic
level, the tenacity of place and of geopolitical designs comes to mark individuals in ways
that discursively change both the recipient and author of imposed forms of understanding,
increasingly making our lives the eclectic product of foreign discourses and intervention.
As we will see in Chapter Four when we discuss Cold War Latin America, the struggle
for development or democracy has been represented through ideas of modernization alien
to the local histories of the region, often imposed through dictatorship and/or bureaucratic
collusion. The language used by these alleged avenues for change was not only driven by
moral justifications following the enlightened path of Western modernity, but also
Edward Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places,
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) p. 31; cited by Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 692,
n. 25.
50 It is ultimately the body-in-habitus that is the vehicle for a place-in-between, mediating place
and self, actively (materially) and passively (epistemically). To conceive of the body as "a
practico-sensory totality" is to de-center the source of knowledge and "re-center it,"
phenomenologically speaking, to a more ambiguous and dynamic foundation. As Lefebvre says,
which Merleau-Ponty intimated much earlier, "the whole of (social) space proceeds from the
body." See: Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. by D. Nicholson Smith (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1991), p. 405. Moreover, as Casey would agree, places are in us, and in fact are us;
we are subjects "as an expression of the way a place is." See: Casey, "Between Geography and
Philosophy," p. 688. Emphasis in the original.
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preached a pathology of the "national body" intent on "curing" Latin American societies
of their "vulnerability" to social and political revolution, itself a source of modernizing
resistance.5 '
As just one contemporary account on Latin American-U.S. relations
demonstrates, however, there is a profound lack of acknowledgment of the existential
dissonance that the effects of these strategies have had on the social fabric of Latin
American societies:
"As history has repeatedly shown, one can morally justify virtually anything,
making it extraordinarily difficult to dissect any particular policy to determine its
moral pathology. Because of this, no study dealing with international geopolitical
realities can put much stock in declarative policies such as those aimed at
instituting or restoring democracy in a particular country... Such rhetorical
policies may serve as fig leaves for otherwise questionable decisions; they do no
as a rule significantly influence them."52
In the aftermath of the September 1 1 th attacks and the devastating effects of the Bush
Doctrine, it is with a bitter irony that a contemporary study of geopolitics can wash its
hands from the power of language to justify intervention and create material realities. Not
only do discourses and representations "linger in a thousand ways"53 - from subtle,
private discussions, to explicit and extensive political power networks - but through their
popular manifestations it becomes evident how our everyday lives fall prey to foreign
places.54 The geopolitical power of modernity does not lie in what we call reason,
5 For the pathology of language in the Argentine junta's (1976-1983) justifications for repression
and persecution, see: Patricia Weiss Fagen, "Repression and State Security," in Fear At The
Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1992), pp. 39-71.
52 Martin Sicker, The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas: Hemispheric Denial from Monroe
to Clinton (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 4.
5 Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 688
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progress, or modernization, but in our active participation in a set of myths that we
conceive as our own and which are embedded into our very ideas of human life. The
separation of place and self thus rests on a tradition of thought that has defined our world
as one in need of sovereignty and security, an epistemic condition that is achieved by the
exacerbation of difference through the veils of a territorial (and psychological) sense of
identity.
Writing Security and the Tenacity of Exclusion
By discussing the complex and intricate web of meanings and harmonies between
critical geopolitics and phenomenology, I have been attempting to reveal an element of
thought that is characteristic of what is geopolitical in us. The desire to inhabit more
places, as a result of the habitudinal bond that I desire to share with all places, is thus
reflective of the basic intentional character of embodied human existence (habitus). The
spatial character of existence carries within it many ontological possibilities; however, it
is ambiguous and can get distracted in its experience of the world. This distraction alters
self-understanding from a geographical self (constituted by a communal being-in-the-
world), to a sovereign, self-sufficient subject of ontological primacy that conceives its
own activity as one of metaphysical primacy. In clearer terms, the spatial character of
human existence, by engaging in the politicized practice of expanding its own sense of
place, understands its activity as constitutive of reality. Geopolitics, as the international
reflection of state activity, is rooted in the modern subject's sense of identity.
* As Frangois Debrix shows in Tabloid Terror, the politics of everyday fear continue to be alive
and well in the U.S. in the aftermath of September 11th. Primarily through media strategies
representing the need for a war on terror, a state of abjection has been imposed on the American
public resulting in the propagation and normalization of violence, both internationally and (if
need be) domestically as well. See: Debrix, Tabloid Terror, pp. 69-89.
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From the Monroe Doctrine to the Free Trade Area of the Americas, U.S.
geopolitical projects and designs have historically presented a view of the Western
hemisphere that has failed to include the experience and participation of Latin American
thinkers and states (in heterogeneous terms) based primarily on their difference to the
ideals of the "Western" (Euro-American) experience. 5 Such marginalization has been
part of a process that has situated the North Atlantic as the arbiter of the world, the light
that guides the march of Reason and Progress, teaching others the gospel of modernity
that ensures survival and enlightenment. Geopolitical cultures have thus traditionally
presented an understanding of place that sees their origin as structured and hardened by
experience and maturity (the tenacity of spatial sovereignty), while their objects remain
porous and in need of lessons for salvation (the thinning-out of place).
As Dussel suggests, modernity's sense of place rests on the foundations of a
singular ontology of security, a sense of subjectivity and identity that begins from the
inside. To speak of the underside of modernity, as he suggests, is to speak of the
underside of the West's geopolitical culture of self-foundation, of the totality that
represents Latin American countries as children that must listen to a father's advice,
counting on his charity to survive. 56 "The logic of totality," Dussel writes, "pursues its
discourse from identity (or foundation) to difference. It is a logic of nature or of
" Slater provides a detailed account on the differences between Eurocentrism and Euro-
Americanism, a set of distinctions that situates the study of the geopolitics of knowledge as most
visibly occurring in the history of the Americas. See: Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial,
pp. 10-17.
56 See: Enrique Dussel, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the
Philosophy of Liberation, trans. and ed. by Eduardo Mendieta (New Jersey: Humanities Press,
1996), pp. 51-53.
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totalitarianism. It is the logic of the alienation of exteriority...of the other person."57
Recognition of this condition, however, does not merely rely on the unmasking of
multinational corporations or the dissolution of an old political order, but instead requires
an epistemic strategy with a self-critical and geo-historical scope that recognizes its
place(ment) in modernity in order to overcome it, an approach to be fleshed out in
Chapter Four.
Following Dussel's insight on the geopolitical logic of Western philosophy, it is
specifically in the idea of the state (the central concept of political modernity and the
traditional understanding of international relations) that we see the attempt at a territorial
communion with the human self most visibly at work. The state is not a universal given,
but rather a construction whose "health" and stability (particularly since Machiavelli, but
more so since Hobbes) has been increasingly equated with the health and stability of
society and the human being. The nature of its construction constitutes a significant
change in the history of Western political thought from the communion of ethics,
sociality, and Being via Thomism, to the humanism and radical secularity of the nation-
state associated with Machiavelli and the rise of the Reformation.58 The rise of the state
thus marked the end of an arduous, epistemic synthesis that, according to E.H. Carr,
quickly dissolved as "the divergence between political theory and political practice
became acute and challenging," 59 and the structure and ethos of the medieval world
57 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, p. 42; see also: Dussel, The Underside of Modernity,
pp. 53-54.
58 Brian R. Nelson, Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), pp. 96-102.
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changed and collapsed. From the emergence of "modern" thought onwards, the stability
of the state (and of the human self) has rested on the moral (and discursive) normalization
and expansion of geographical categories and thus territorial boundaries - as David
Campbell aptly points out:
"The construction of social space that emerges from practices associated with the
paradigm of sovereignty... exceed a simple geographical partitioning: it results in
a conception of divergent moral spaces. In other words, the social space of inside
/ outside is both made possible by and helps constitute a moral space of superior /
inferior, which can be animated in terms of any number of figurations of higher /
lower." 60
The existential ambiguity of embodied consciousness is thus usurped by a geographical
determinism, the result of historical narratives of territorial and psychological stability
veiling political and military clashes of interests and power (the drive of habitus for
spatial sovereignty). The subtlety of this geographical determinism has been perpetuated
through terms like "First World" and "Third World" that continue to have an axiological
effect on our understanding and interpretation of international relations. Even a phrase
like "the developing world" reflects a certain sociological bias (though often unconscious
and unintentional) that not only facilitates a certain discourse of "maturity" that is
prevalent in the North-Atlantic, but also distorts and eclipses the transnational dialogues
that time and again have been attempted by thinkers on all sides of the world, particularly
from Latin America and Africa.6 1 Geopolitics becomes a material reality affecting human
59 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1964 [1939, 1946]), p. 63.
60 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 73
61 For just one example detailing how transnational attempts at dialogue in international relations
have been frustrated by academic biases and exclusions, see: Naeem Inayatullah and David L.
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identity by establishing a pattern of identity that regulates (and is regulated by) the
bordering of language: by "placing" language and forms of expression on a geographical
hierarchy of social exclusion that makes the foreign a threat to the familiar.
Campbell's insights into the constitution of identity in the practice of foreign
policy allows us to see this appropriation of place and language at work in the geo-
historical experience of the U.S. By enabling (North) American geopolitical discourses to
manifest a certain reliance on the production of fear-based and threat-based
constructions62 , we see how these constructions are tied to the domestic, territorial
struggles that were central to the formation of U.S. national identity: the internalization of
an epistemic contrast between civilization and barbarism. 63 As Campbell maintains, "with
no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality,
states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming."64 Danger provides the
scenario for the evolution of U.S. identity that has allowed certain notions of freedom and
security to become the emblems through which its geopolitical projects are carried out.65
Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, (New York: Routledge, 2004),
pp. 1-17
62 As he elaborates in much more detail: "Foreign policy is one part of a multifaceted process of
inscription that disciplines by framing man in the spatial and temporal organization of the inside
and outside, self and other, i.e., in the 'state'. These practices do not operate in terms of a
domestic society that is pre-given, nor do they signify an absolute and pre-existing space from
which the threats to domestic society emerge. Their very operation frames the domestic society in
whose name they claim to be operating through their claim to know the source of threats to
domestic society and 'man."' See: Campbell, Writing Security, p. 62.
63 Campbell, Writing Security, pp. 107-16.
64 Ibid., p. 12.
65 This double synthesis of exclusion and inclusion is what makes the U.S. a "post-colonial
empire." For further discussion on this term, see: Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, pp.
13-17.
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By relying on a moral differentiation that makes the U.S. the inheritor of modernity's
"civilizing" mission, the idea of security found in U.S. foreign policy rests on two
assumptions: first, the communion of geographical expansion (and imperialism) with the
West's historical mission of civilization and becoming (the habitude of modernity); and
second, the localizing of this mission within the boundaries, violence and identity of the
United States itself (the habitus of U.S. national identity). Modernity thus literally plays
itself out in the habitudes and geopolitical actions of the United States, where the writing
of space (as the drive for spatial sovereignty) becomes the new national and international
language of modernity:
"The effectiveness of foreign policy as one political practice among many that
serves to discipline ambiguity and construct identity is made possible because it
is one instance of a series of cultural practices central to modernity operating
within its one specific domain...The paradigm of sovereignty operates on the
basis of a simple dichotomy: sovereignty versus anarchy."66
Through the inscription of foreignness (the writing of foreign policy) - an act that is
pivotal to the articulation of danger to territorial sovereignty 67 - the boundaries of
national (and human!) identity are ideationally and geographically defined within the
hierarchy of the state as "foreign policy helps produce and reproduce the political identity
of the doer supposedly behind the deed."68 Such a reproduction occurs through the need
to make the state's identity (along with the people inside) a fixed process of rational
becoming, achieving the singularity of reason and civilization that modernity's gospel of
66 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 65.
67 Ibid., p. 3.
68 Ibid., p. x.
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progress rests upon.69 Just as "man" had become the central object and subject of reason
at the turn of the Renaissance, so too the state, through the identity of its territory with the
mission of its people, has become reason itself: its geopolitical activity becomes the
discourse of a new reality. 70 The world, however, clearly remains in language through the
situated and historical modes of interpretation that are sanctioned or outlawed by the state
(in particular through its cartographical determinism). Such a condition not only
acknowledges the performative constitution of language in relation to human identity and
praxis71, but also reveals how performativity is, from modernity's very beginning, "the
condition of possibility by which we have historically been able to perceive the state and
its practices."72
Particularly in the deployment of what I call Cold War Reason - the mobilization
of discourses equating popular and liberation movements with anachronistic and
cancerous ways of being73 - we find that foreign policy practices of intervention,
subversion, and international exclusion have been historically unleashed as a geopolitical
praxis of liberation and modernization. What these strategies reflect, as Campbell
suggests, is a geopolitics of knowledge justifying violence and slander on the basis of
rendering as dangerous that which is unfamiliar:
69 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 66.
70 Ibid., p. 67.
71 Ibid., p. 6.
72 Ibid., p. 79.
7 As Campbell and others have noted, "one of the central functions [in the representation of the
social] has been to permit and commission the representation of danger to the social body in
terms associated to the representation of danger to the physiological body." See: Ibid., p. 80.
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"The mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which
exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus de-naturalizes the claim
of a particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the
understanding of a threat...that objectifies events, disciplines relations, and
sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk."74
The threat of de-naturalization during the Cold War in Latin America has allowed U.S.
policies to be more effectively enacted through internalized practices and ways of
thinking. Outright military intervention was not deemed necessary so long as a domestic
group or class perceived U.S. foreign policy interests as the "correct" strategies of social
and political organization, and more importantly, perceived themselves to be part of these
strategies from the very beginning. The analysis of the use of representational discourses
to include non-Western peoples into the narrative of modernity - a practice known as
Occidentalism - is crucial to my argument here and will be the subject of Chapter Four.
The critique of this practice - coming primarily from Latin American circles, but actively
engaged in by certain critical geographers - seeks to open for us a dialogical place-in-
between that further assesses the geopolitics of knowledge and questions the possibilities
for a geopolitics of liberation. Such an assessment nevertheless requires a preliminary re-
thinking of the possibilities of language and dissent, a re-envisioning that does not see
language as the source of sovereignty, but rather as the condition of possibility for
international relations as coexistence and the anticipation of new horizons.
Dissent and the Anticipation of Language
The discursive emphasis on the practice of geopolitics and international relations
would not be complete without a reflection on the powers, pitfalls, and podsis of
language. As Campbell reminds us, interpretation is almost always guilty of recreating
74 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 3.
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dichotomies of power and meaning that influence the way we perceive, and indeed talk
about, geopolitical constructions:
"[T]he imposition of an interpretation on the ambiguity and contingency of social
life always results in an other being marginalized. Meaning and identity are,
therefore, always the consequence of a relationship between the self and the other
that emerges through the imposition of an interpretation, rather than being the
product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own pre-established
identity."75
A critical approach to both geopolitics and international relations thus demands that we
reconnect the dots of interpretation back to the multiple instances of history that make
their interaction an act of podsis: the communal inclusion of perspectives that have been
eclipsed from view, but which are central to the geo-historical formation of identity. In a
language that is perhaps more akin to our phenomenological critique, Merleau-Ponty
suggests the following insight: "In so far as we live with others, no judgment we make on
them is possible which leaves us out, and which places them at a distance."76 Language
"bridges" the distance between people, even if it is a language that distorts and excludes
the participation of others: the fact that I represent the other as a threat to my way of
being, does not erase the fact the she too exists, that she too has her own history and way
of being; in spite of its attempts to do so, the testimony of injustice remains "written" on
the wall if you will, making exclusion all the more evident. To think of this interaction in
terms of podsis is to imaginatively rediscover the facets and dimensions of language
shared by all communities, rooted in the interaction between human consciousness and
the world, that is to say, to engage in the phenomenological project.
75 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 23.
76 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1963), p. 4 1.
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The language of critique and dissent thus also possesses a performative quality,
not only in its recreation of a "geo-graph" of responsibility as Sparke highlighted in
Chapter Two, but primarily through its effects on everyday human practices. The
discursive and ideational run parallel to each other and their segregation (the ontological
privileging of one over the other) is the result of a academic exclusion that recreates the
perception of threat, a condition of possibility for the establishment of primordiality.
There is a certain temptation for otherness in the establishment of the primordial, one that
implicitly recognizes the other as the structure of my subjectivity, as Levinas would say,
but also as part of the modern ego's desire to find and eliminate difference. By reflecting
a desire to "border" alternative epistemologies and experiences (by becoming self-
referential), modern identity makes that which is other a problem for its being and re-
affirms its primordiality. Modern existence is thus conditioned (perhaps even
condemned) by the writing of space, making critical thought the enunciation and
reinterpretation of the locations from which this writing occurs.
How do we avoid Campbell's warning, however, and suspend resistance from
becoming a new process of geopolitical writing that undermines the ethical spirit of
revolt? Dissent must not only be self-reflective of the performative power that language
possesses, but as Merleau-Ponty suggests, it must also anticipate change in its challenge
to primordiality:
"[W]e should define the very function of speech as its power to say as a whole
more than it says word by word, to precede itself, whether in throwing the other
toward what I know which he has not yet understood, or in carrying oneself
toward what one is going to understand."77
7 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, p. 131.
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Thus the exercise of dissent (as inherently intersubjective) must be an opening of spaces
that seeks emancipation in a process that re-writes and re-constitutes geographies of
power; not for the inversion of power structures, but in order to become the embodiment
of a new praxis and the response to a geopolitical culture of competition that unravels and
overcomes the tenacity of exclusion. To re-think place in international relations is not to
dissolve the links that place has for the myriad human selves in the world, but rather to
re-emphasize these places so as to anticipate a new form of relating and practicing the
everyday in existential coexistence.
Writing on Paul Klee's "Angel of History," Walter Benjamin notes how the past
is "one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage," 78 an image of
ethical reflection, moving forward with its back turned towards the obscurity of the
future. It is this image of being in the place of the present, anticipating the future and
limping along our fragmented way, that opens the possibility to not only find that which
is permanent about the world, but also what defines our human condition as being-in-the-
world. It is with this in mind that we have traced the phenomenological conception and
understanding of place, but also, though more subtly, the grounds of modernity on which
conflict over these conceptions is born, revealing the geopolitical connection to modern
social and political existence that we will continue to address and develop.
The above connection is a key and instrumental conceptualization that generates
what I call "Cold War Reason": a geo-historical understanding that represents "territorial
others," such as Latin America, as places in perpetual need of "protection" and
78 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), p. 259.
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"salvation." In Chapter Four, the local histories in the development of a more inclusive
understanding of place will be given a first-hand look as we move now to critique the
strategy of Occidentalism in U.S. practices of modernization. By developing the
understanding of the geopolitics of knowledge as seen in U.S. academic circles, I will
highlight a political economy of resistance in the work of critical geographers and Latin
American social scientists and philosophers. Through this tactic of critical anticipation, I
will outline a strategy of liberation for the practice of international relations that does not
ground the possibilities for dialogue in the primacy of the modern subject and the
wreckage of the Cold War, but rather in the heterogeneous condition of coexistence that
understands international relations as a communal history and a practice of everyday life.
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Chapter IV: Local Knowledge and the Geopolitics of Liberation
"The Northern narratives that accompanied... encounters with various regions of the South are
imbued with unquestioned presumptions regarding freedom, democracy, and self-determination,
as well as the identities of the subjects who are entitled to enjoy these things. These narratives
serve as windows onto more global systems of representation."'
- Roxanne Lynn Doty
The ancient Mayan city of Copan, located in Western Honduras, was known
during its Classical period to engage in a curious spatial practice. Every other generation,
the ascending king would begin his reign by having the city before him literally buried,
rebuilding on top of the various mounds of earth. Since the city he was born into reflected
the reign and legacy of a previous ruler, the new ruler's burial practice set about
"writing" his own legacy and, in fact, the empire's own history.2 As a writing of the
earth, today's visitors are exposed to the ruins' different layers of architecture and
memory that remain underground and "covered" by stucco and clay - dormant walls
lying underneath with expectation. Mayan architecture in particular was renowned for its
intricate patterns, designs, and histories, all written on the walls of its chambers, tunnels,
and social centers. The above image provides an apt metaphor for the creative exchange
of embodied consciousness and the lived-experience of place in the world that was
described in the previous chapter. Even outside the reach of the West's tenacity of
exclusion (the logic of composition that posits difference as an outside threat to identity)
we can find across world history a peculiar desire to cover and eclipse those parts of the
Roxanne Lynn-Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South
Relations, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 3
2 See: David Webster, "The Archaeology of Copan, Honduras," Journal of Archaeological
Research (Vol. 7, No. 1, 1999), pp. 1-53.
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past that might be perceived as a threat to a group's possibilities and act as an anchor on
the horizons of social and individual becoming.
My point here is not to address the local significance of Mayan indigenous
practices, but rather to re-emphasize the relationship between the writing of space and
human identity that lies at the center of our human experience of place and the world.
Such an insight not only attempts to reveal the epistemic structures that the experience of
place (Western and otherwise) engenders in human consciousness, but in the process
seeks to reveal how the writing of these structures has been historically attributed a
Western (Euro-American) privilege. Similarly, phenomenology finds itself to be a
product of Western philosophy and modernity, yet it remains on the fringes of modern
subjectivity's drive for sovereignty by re-thinking the epistemic foundations that Western
thought has taken for granted, allowing us to interpret the meaningful practices of other
peoples of the world, along with their lived-experience of place and history. By focusing
on the intersubjective and intentional interaction of the material and the ideational,
phenomenology provides us with a mirror that mediates the local and the distant, that
challenges the self-referential assumptions underlying modern notions of identity and
difference, displacing their epistemic monopoly. Through the phenomenological lens, the
relations between Mayan city-states may not be fit under the same analytic rubric as those
of Italy in Machiavelli's time, but they instead reflect a connection between a sense of
self and an experience of place that amounts to a kind of spatial ontology: the writing of
space that affirms an experience as primordial (constitutive) and is given an epistemic
primacy.
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It would seem for a moment that all phenomenology is then able to offer us is the
manifestation of a shared conceit for power across history and geography. However, as
Sparke and Casey reminded us in Chapters Two and Three, phenomenology also reveals
that the writing of space remains fundamentally embroiled in the idea of difference in
relation to the multiple experiences there are of place and the founding of a geographical
self. More clearly, phenomenology is rooted in the experience of multiple subjects, both
inside (the self) and outside (in the world). Without the fact that there is a concrete reality
outside of "my" sense of place, no sense of appropriation would be at all possible. The
experiences of place - both as a geographical self and the universal subject of modernity
found in geopolitical designs - are rooted in the sedimentation of perception and
expression that makes human identity unequivocally geo-historical and open to the
indeterminacy of experience, thought and language. I am in the world, only as much as I
recognize that the world is also in me; the world is defined by difference, only as much as
I recognize that I too am defined by that very difference.
My initial reflection thus turns the present concerns with geopolitics into an
interrogation of the past and to the role of representation in the structures of everyday
thought: first, in terms of the modern notion of sovereign identity, as we saw in Chapter
Three; and second, as we will argue here, as a means of resistance and liberation from the
totalizing effects of modern reason. By highlighting a phenomenology of "counter-
veiling" 3 (how one subject's ideas and concepts overlap, intersect and are challenged by
the geo-historical realities of another subject), our study of place takes us now into the
relationship between memory and the logic of writing in the geopolitics of knowledge. As
3 David Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, p. 85.
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a more insidious form of geopolitics, the geopolitics of knowledge reflects a synthesis
that finds its strongest manifestation today in the power of academic centers of
knowledge and their practices of exclusion concerning perspectives that challenge their
hegemony. As the Argentine historian Ricardo Salvatore points out:
"Research projects are inserted into distinct political projects and are
comprehensible within a certain geographical and cultural location. Hence, the
history of their achievements and failures should be read in relation to..."global
designs" - large projects of geopolitical expansion that correspond to certain
moments in the development of global capitalism." 4
By highlighting the place-bound nature of all exercises of knowledge (as embodied
discourses) Salvatore hints at the way that "the enterprise of knowledge" has been
historically a means of expanding hegemonic power through "the production and
circulation of truthful representations about the regions that fall under its gaze and
influence." 5 These representations, the products of broader discourses of geographical
and philosophical determinism, "embody the [geopolitical] center's will to know and, at
the same time, reveal fragments of a larger project of incorporating the other (the
peripheral region) into the dominant field of visibility." 6 The production of knowledge is
never free from the history and context that give birth to it and (as we have seen in the
case of foreign policy) its intentions are tied to the controlled reproduction of its own
objects of representation: knowledge is imperial in its very attempts to describe the local.
Yet locality persists, as Casey and others reminds us, through the processes of adaptation
4 Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Local versus Imperial Knowledge: Reflections on Hiram Bingham and
the Yale Peruvian Expedition," in Nepantla: Views from the South (Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2003), p. 69.
5 Salvatore, "Local versus Imperial Knowledge," p. 67.
6 Ibid., p. 67.
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that peoples caught in the middle of geopolitical competition inaugurate upon being
conquered.7
Imperial Knowledge and the Culture of Competition
As the work of Campbell and others8 have shown, the marginalization of
difference as a strategy of identity and dominance reveals how the development and
practice of U.S. foreign policy remains one of the most representative examples of a
geopolitics of place and knowledge. Whether it is territorially or academically driven, the
desire for omniscience over the local (for the designing of salvation and progress in
relation to a threatening outside) always emerges from an equally situated position, but
one that lies within an established hierarchy of privilege and power.9 Such a hierarchy is
then naturalized into expansionist narratives that give priority to the universal (History,
Reason) in opposition to the particular (place, local knowledge). As Casey reminds us,
however, the mindful absorption into the local - as the awareness that place (particularly
those places that have been eclipsed by geopolitical designs and agendas) always has a
life and history of its own that we take part in when we engage it, aware of this or not -
helps us "to grasp the particular place we are in as the particular person who we are."' 0 In
7 See: Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas, pp. 50-52 and Tzvetan Todorov, The
Conquest of America, pp. 202-06.
8 For works on the geopolitics of knowledge in U.S. political identity formation, see: Tom
Engelhardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a
Generation, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998); for an account on the
geopolitics of geography and map production, see: Susan Schulten, The Geographical
Imagination and Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies; for an account on the geopolitics of
cultural representation, see: Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing The Cold War.
9 For a similar account of this condition from a post-structural perspective, see O Tuathail's
notion of the geopolitical gaze in: Gearoid O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, pp. 69-74.
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a local sense, the phenomenological perspective on place is self-critical by beginning
from the experience of a self that is outside in-the-world (in place and with others), and
not in an epistemically privileged position of absolute knowledge, demonstrating that
geopolitics begins with the effacement of the outside through the privileging of what is
inside.
For our present concerns - the use of modernization theories" in the geopolitical
objectives of the U.S. in Latin America - the distinction between local and imperial
knowledge takes us into an appropriate reflection on how modernization designs
privilege local U.S. experience (as the universal inheritor of Western modernity) over the
local knowledge and experience of Latin American states and peoples. In the context of
the Cold War, modernization was not based on the mere development of technology
through the systematic application of knowledge and specialization 2 , but rather on the
"total transformation of traditional and pre-modern societies into the types of technology
and associated social organization that characterized the politically stable nations of the
10 Edward Casey, "Between Geography and Philosophy," p. 684.
" Though the body of modernization theory in U.S. social science circles is too broad to
enumerate here, for a key study concerning the mobilization and differentiation of Western, social
ideals in the post-WWII environment, see: Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," in American Political Science Review (Vol. 55, Issue 3, Sept. 1961), pp. 493-514;
for a study concerning the shift from the distribution of positive ideals to a focus on maintaining
political order and institutional stability, see: Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and for ideas concerning the place and
responsibility of the U.S. in both mobilizing and maintaining (to the point of intervention)
international development, stability and security, see: W.W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of
Growth, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
12 Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, p. 59.
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Western world."" No longer reflecting a project of engagement and situated
development, modernization (in order to be effective, according to U.S. decision-makers,
statesmen, intellectuals and their counterparts in the Latin American elite' 4 ) needed to
deploy a hierarchy of cultures that rests on the assumed dependency of subaltern
knowledge on the projects and designs of Western (Euro-American) thought and the
centrality of capitalist competition in their development.
The end of the Second World War had provided the capitalist economies of the
Western world with a renewed impetus in the international system as, according to Eric
Hobsbawm, a period of "extraordinary economic growth and social transformation"
began, "which probably changed human society more profoundly than any other period
of comparable brevity."' 5 The focus of modernization during this period shifted from the
reconstruction of war-torn societies to meeting the demands of a veritable post-war
Golden Age.16 The marriage between modernization and free-market capitalism was thus
set to the tune of competing against the "other winner" of the war, the centralized model
of the Soviet Union. Rather than acknowledging the ironic and unique role of the Soviet
experience' 7 in its own historical development, however, capitalist modernization quickly
13 Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, p. 60.
14 Ibid., pp. 59 and 77.
1 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage
Books, 1996), p. 6.
16 Ibid., pp. 8-9; see esp.: pp. 257-86.
17 As Hobsbawm and others have noted, the Soviet Union was - militarily, economically and
ideologically - the driving force behind the Allied victory against Nazi Germany. Its struggle
with the U.S. for worldwide influence during the early and middle stages of the Cold War (1947-
1981) not only gave fruit to a technological and cultural Golden Age, but also set the stage for a
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sought to burn its ideological challenger out. Competition, after all, is the driving force of
capitalism; without it, individuals cannot be guided the Invisible Hand of the Market that
regulates inefficient behavior. Harmony and peace are achieved, according to this gospel,
when states "learn" the right and rational economic behavior, which by all classical
accounts since Smith and Ricardo entailed the liberalization of commerce and trade. By
no means does this idea find its origins in the Cold War. As E.H. Carr suggests, it is
rooted in the very inception of the idea of a harmony between capital and the modern
nation-state:
"Once industrial capitalism and the class system had become the recognized
structure of society, the doctrine of the harmony of interests acquired a new
significance, and became ...the ideology of a dominant group concerned to
maintain its predominance b asserting the identity of its interests with those of
the community as a whole."'
Though Carr was writing about Western Europe at the turn of the twentieth century, his
insights can be translated to reflect the struggle between the Cold War superpowers that
turned Latin America (and the targeted "developing" world) into a field of battle for their
own geopolitical interests. Following this background we find that from the very
beginning of modernization strategies in the neo-colonial period, the question of
development and change in Latin America increasingly became a question of
Americanization 1: the adoption (at times imposed, at times welcomed) of a culture of
re-thinking of modernization (as it was promoted abroad) along the lines of free-market
capitalism. For an extended account of the changes in economic policy towards the developing
world, see: Ibid., pp. 344-71. For a critical, revisionist account of Soviet representations in U.S.
academic and policy circles, see: Stephen F. Cohen, Re-Thinking the Soviet Experience: Politics
and History Since 1917, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
i8 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 44.
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competition into the social fabric of peoples that had not lived through a parallel history
and development, and who because of this were already assumed to be inferior.20
There are two important points to this dimension of modernization: the first, is the
assumed superiority of Western states as opposed to Latin American states; the second,
which will be addressed in the following section, is the unforeseen rise of popular and
nationalist movements that the gospel of modernization would inadvertently promote in
the region. As Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney suggest in their analyses of
international political economy (IPE), the geo-historical dimension behind
modernization's geopolitical objectives is often eclipsed by the representation of poorer
and less competitive countries (the "third world" or the "developing world") as
"tangential [sites] for theoretical application,"2 1 and thus is hardly presented as a source
of insight or collaboration for the global economy. Such a pedagogical conception of
rich-poor state relations (as a practice that conceptually frames the terms of the relation to
be studied) stems from the modern understanding of the state as a rational and sovereign
unit seeking self-interested gains and security.
Modernization, along with IPE, posits competition within the broader
understanding of capitalism as the maximization of productivity and wealth by economic
19 For work on the inadequate strategies of U.S. corporations in Latin American economies, see:
Celso Furtado, "U.S. Hegemony and the Future of Latin America," in I.L. Horowitz, J. de Castro,
and J. Gerassi (eds.), Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist
Movements, (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 61-74. For work on U.S. practices of profit
repatriation, see: J. de Castro, "Introduction: Not One Latin America," in Ibid., pp. 235-48.
20 See: Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of
Difference
21 Ibid. p. vii.
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actors.2 Competition in the world economy is thus conceptualized as natural in a
capitalist system and (through the experiences of its most efficient producers) it develops
parameters of behavior that allegedly lead to the creation of more wealth and better
standards of life. By treating competition as a given of international life, however,
mainstream IPE scholars and narratives (of the Realist and Neo-Liberal variety 3 ) ignore
the intersubjective and geo-historical dimension of competition as a social practice and a
set of parameters that:
"[Juxtapose] certain values and principles while centering a certain type of self
and framing its relations with others...betraying an uneasy tension expressing
both the equality of actors and...the substantive denial of the equality."24
Inayatullah and Blaney's insight suggests that the constitution of parameters, identities
and values through the practice of competition creates an epistemic dichotomy - "a
division of knowledge"25 - between perceiving myself as a self-sufficient state (the
modern subject), but also as a state that needs to follow a certain set of established,
"universal" rules of economic behavior (particularly for those states that are not at the top
22 See: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. by
Edwin Cannan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 [1776]), p. 15; see also: Friedrich A.
Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Volume 1 - Rules and Order, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 13-14.
3 For an overview of these mainstream assumptions, see: Robert Gilpin, Global Political
Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001) and Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, p. 130
25 For Hayek, this division is a source of "discovery" and not necessarily antagonism; see:
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960),
pp. 29; 44-45. For a critical analysis of the shift from Smith's "division of labor" to Hayek's
"division of knowledge," and the implications it carries for both a hierarchy of values and the
geopolitics of knowledge, see: Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem
of Difference, pp. 139-145.
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of the economic order). Competition is thus not a fact of nature, but a social practice, a
construction that has come to espouse "common" meanings and values that promote a
certain way of life through the geo-economic writing of space practiced by international
financial institutions (mostly located in the developed world), leading to the eclipsing of
place and its local specificities. 26
By mobilizing a notion of the state as the rational structure behind a set of social
practices27 , modernization privileges imperial knowledge over local knowledge through
the expansion of habitus (as I explained in Chapter Three) and the "policing of
subjectivity." 28 The state as an agent of competition and security, in the words of
Venezuelan anthropologist Fernando Coronil, "[seizes] its subjects by inducing a
condition or state of being receptive to its illusions."29 Coronil suggests that the magical
(veiling) power of the state rests on the representation of its activity, within the scheme of
competition, as the ultimate force behind the drawing and bounding of place and identity
(spatial sovereignty). Such an act of creation, however, is only possible after having
26 See: Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem ofDifference, pp. 132,
and 155-56; see also: Smith, American Empire.
2 In economic modernization, it is perhaps Hegemonic Stability Theory that is most
representative of this state-centric prejudice, though its theoretical groundwork is clearly based on
Realist-oriented principles of IPE and IR theory in general. See: Charles Kindleberger, The World
in Depression: 1929-39, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Robert Gilpin, U.S.
Power and the Multinational Corporation, (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Stephen
Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," in World Politics, (Vol. XXVIII,
No. 3, 1976), pp. 317-47. For an account of the variations between Kindleberger's "collective
goods" theory and Gilpin and Krasner's "leadership theory," see: David A. Lake, "Leadership,
Hegemony and the International Economy," in International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, 1993, pp.
459-89.
28 Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, p. 68.
29 Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 5.
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internalized a set of designs and values into its domestic practices of everyday life and
establishing a sense of habitus. The hierarchy of values that emerges within international
competition (the rational parameters of economic behavior) is mirrored in the domestic
hierarchy of values in a state's identity.30 With this in mind, "knowledge of the other,
inflected by the equation of difference or inferiority, becomes a means for the physical
destruction, enslavement, or crucial exploitation of the other."3'
Values and identities spread across local and international communities by being
represented as standards of being that are to be followed by "rational" and "self-
interested" actors. Such a pathology of competition works, Inayatullah and Blaney write,
"to partly erase the very difference that it claims to value,"32 by flattening difference into
material and intellectual divisions ("resources" in the language of competition) that are
only mobilized as part of experiments to legitimate an existing order or to paint dissent as
a threat or aberration. The tenacity of competition thus reduces coexistence and the
experience of place to experimentation: the rationally calculable behavior of self-
interested, competitive actors, scattered across the chessboard of geopolitical designs.
Read in light of this culture of competition, the assumptions of mainstream
30 For the most popular conceptualization of this view of the state, see: Immanuel Wallerstein,
The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Wallerstein, however, only begins to tackle the
problems behind the complex levels of domination and exploitation found in international
economic behavior. For further discussion of the epistemic boundaries created by economic
imperialism, see: V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, (New York:
International Publishers, 1939), pp. 27-8; Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power and
Eurocentrism in Latin America," pp. 218-222; and Jose Marti, Nuestra Amdrica, (La Habana:
Casa de las Americas, 1974).
3 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem ofDifference, p. 11.
32 Ibid., p. 158.
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modernization and IPE approaches thus become manifestations of Occidentalism: the
representational practice that effaces differences in order to posit a "universal" and
"coherent" understanding of history and reality, as seen from Western rationality. By re-
assessing the colonial and neocolonial legacies of Western political economy, however,
the histories behind these strategies can be brought into relief through a critical
engagement (a space-in-between) with modernization theory and the larger assumptions
of Western philosophy and international political thought that questions their alleged
univocality. Far from discrediting the insights of these traditions, this reading radicalizes
their naturalized ideas by revealing how mainstream approaches in the study of
international relations have justified these acts of representation, eclipsing the geo-
historical markers of difference that have informed their own identity.
Latin America and the Pathologies of Modernization
"Our fear of understanding a point of view belies a deeper fear that we shall be taken up by it,
find it contagious, become infected in a morally perilous way
by the thinking of the presumed enemy."33
- Judith Butler
Modernization designs during the Cold War rested on a set of phenomenological
precepts underlying ideas of national security and economic prosperity. By
"modernizing" the developing world, a practice of spatial habitation was reenacted that
justified (if not outright supported) the violent suppression and eclipsing of ways of life
and expression that were different and counter to U.S. foreign policy and geo-economic
objectives. It is important to note here that the geo-historical characteristics of Latin
America make it perhaps the most exemplary case from which to outline the geopolitics
33 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, (London: Verso, 2004),
p. 8
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of knowledge in the twentieth century, but also the most difficult to examine and express
in simple terms.34 Since its very conception, the term Latin America has been used to
denote a place-in-between, a utopia of sorts ("neither Indian nor European,"35 as Bolivar
had said) that finds itself lost in a labyrinth of paths and alternatives: perpetually subject
to the designs and ideas emerging from the "high road" of modernity, yet stubbornly
resilient to assume an uncritical and subservient role. It is this unique appropriation of
geopolitical ideas and the establishment of methods to counter hegemony that makes the
Latin American experience a central moment in the development and study of
international relations, geopolitics, and IR theory: a tragic, yet hopeful translation of the
fragmented idea of Latin America.36
The appropriation and translation of modern discourses of power reflects an
attitude (or perhaps habitude) of emancipating and participatory engagement that not
only takes up the challenge of these discourses, but also overcomes their conceptual and
existential limitations. By re-thinking the premises of modernization, critical Latin
American approaches to U.S. designs of power challenge the geopolitics of security and
knowledge through a geopolitics of liberation: an epistemic de-colonization of the gospel
of modernity through the phenomenological re-thinking of subjectivity, reason, and
34 On the geo-historical context of the Latin American experience, see: Walter D. Mignolo, Local
Histories/Global Designs, pp. 127-44; Dussel, The Invention of the Americas, pp. 73-78; see
especially: Enrique Dussel, Hip6tesis para el estudio de Latinoamerica en historia universal,
(Unpublished Manuscript, 1965; Website:
http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/dussel/histouniv/historia.html)
3 Sim6n Bolivar, "Reply of a South American to a Gentleman of [Jamaica]," Sept. 6th, 1815, in
Sim6n Bolivar (trans. by Lewis Bertrand, Harold Bierck, ed., comp. by Vicente Lecuna), Selected
Writings of Bolivar, (2 Vols., New York: Colonial Press, 1952), Vol. I: pp. 104-05.
36 For a post-Occidental understanding of this experience, see: Walter D. Mignolo, The Idea of
Latin America, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
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revolution, all seeking to overcome the Western pathology of salvation.37 In short, this
kind of geopolitics of liberation inverts the mirror of Western thought by revealing the
geopolitical foundations of power and marginalization that have informed the Western
myths of reason, progress and freedom, thus displacing the telos of geopolitical reason by
forging a place-in-between for all critical modes of thought. Particularly on Latin
America's place in the Cold War, there is no single way to express the varied instances of
domination and resistance that color its tragic history.38 One can nevertheless begin by
highlighting a strategy that was key for modernization, not only for the deployment of its
power through what I call Cold War Reason, but primarily for the representation of
difference as a threat and vulnerability.
Occidentalism and the Representation of Political Space
Political economy has been historically fueled by the discovery of new lands and
the possibility of new products and exchanges, providing groundbreaking insights into
the human, social and political nature of production, exchange and consumption across
the ideological spectrum. Yet its insights and categories rest on the historical and place-
bound experience of North-Atlantic (Euro-American) modernity. As Doty reminds us, in
their discursive ontology, imperial encounters with allegedly new worlds "become
missions of deliverance and salvation rather than conquests and exploitations." 39
Unflinching in its proclamation of objectivity and universality, the political economy of
37 For just a few examples of this epistemic de-colonization at work, see: Jose Carlos Mariitegui,
7 Ensayos de Interpretacidn de la Realidad Peruana, (La Habana: Casa de las Americas, 1963);
Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation; and Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America.
38 For one contemporary account, see: Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America
in the Cold War, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004)
39 Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 11.
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modernization (as a by-product of the historical, economic and political experience of
the West40) assumes from its very inception that the global South is epistemically rooted
in the same conception of capital and production as the roots of human progress, that is to
say, that their economic behavior should necessarily reflect the "realities" of the global
system around them. The nature of these allegations, however, has been traditionally
approached without questioning many of their assumptions about the social nature of
political economy, let alone about the origins and development of the modern world
system.41 These assumptions have interpreted the experience of developing countries as
deviations from what is otherwise the "smooth" development of Western capitalist
practices. The difficulties in the development of these countries, moreover, are to be
understood as a result of their alleged backwardness, lack of accountability, and
unwillingness to accept the "necessary" changes to achieve a stable, economic order.
Poverty is the result of a lack of "vision" by these countries and the failure to understand
their place in the world economy and world history.
These are familiar discourses in modernization and IPE literature on Latin
America42 and are reflective of a broader bias in the Western social sciences that
epistemically assumes that the "recipients" of international political theories (the
40 See: Quijano, "Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America".
4' For an account of these assumptions, see: Fernando Coronil, "Beyond Occidentalism: Towards
Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories," in Cultural Anthropology, (Vol. 11, No. 1, Feb., 1996),
pp. 51-87
42 See: Luigi Manzetti, "Political Manipulations and Market Reforms Failures," in World Politics
(Issue 55, April 2003), pp. 315-60; Kurt Weyland, "Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and
Eastern Europe," in Comparative Politics (Vol. 31, No. 4, July 1999), pp. 379-401; and more
recently, Kurt Weyland, "Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record," in
Latin American Politics and Society, (Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2004), pp. 135-157
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developing world) are an inherent part of the (Western) process of self-understanding: the
Occidentalist ontology that posits its own experience of reality as the only legitimate
interpretation, representing the expressions of non-Western peoples as the other of the
Western experience, as passive subjects of the West's march of progress. 43 According to
Coronil, the assumptions of Occidentalism reveal that deceptive terms such as "the
West," the "third world," "development," etc., are terms that "are used as if there existed
a distinct external reality to which they corresponded, or at least they have the effect of
creating such an illusion."44 These terms, moreover, posit a distinct materiality that
subjects local histories to a particularly dangerous ideology (and pedagogy) of violence
and domination. Occidentalism is therefore not the a posteriori classification of the world
and its history, but is rather the agglomeration of certain hierarchical assumptions: a
cluster of localized experiences and discourses that mobilize a particular way of
understanding the world so as to perpetuate a set of power structures, meanings, and
values. The description of this strategy not only ties us back to Campbell's concerns in
Chapter Three with the deterministic nature of all interpretation. But it also brings back
the metaphysics of geo-presence (as a manifestation of the geopolitics of knowledge) that
Sparke and Dussel are intent on displacing. As Coronil suggests:
"What is unique about Occidentalism... is not that it mobilizes stereotypical
representations of non-Western societies, for the ethnocentric hierarchization of
cultural difference is certainly not a Western privilege, but that this privilege is
intimately connected to the deployment of global power."4 5
43 Coronil, "Beyond Occidentalism," p. 52
as Ibid.
as Ibid., pp. 56-7.
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Occidentalist representations seek to justify a particular ordering and understanding of
the world in order to prolong its everyday practice and reenactment. In phenomenological
terms, they seek to perpetuate the habitus of spatial sovereignty in the form of a universal
(and unquestionable) ontology. A brief taxonomy of the logic of Occidentalism reveals
the following strategies: (1) the separation of the world's parts into bounded and
unchanging units (the "nation-state," the "West," the "third world," and even traditionally
critical terms such as "core" and "periphery," all suffer from this representational logic);
(2) the disconnecting of relational histories (disconnecting colonialism from
neocolonialist and contemporary strategies of socio-economic dominance and
dependence); (3) the transformation of ethnological differences into a hierarchy of values
(backward, immature Latin Americans versus modern Euro-Americans); (4) the
naturalization of these representations as inherently ontological and constitutive of some
"revealed" reality (the alleged "end of history" achieved by capitalism's "victory" at the
end of the Cold War); and finally, (5) the intervention, "however unwittingly," writes
Coronil, "in the reproduction of existing asymmetrical power relations," 46 often by the
aspirations of cosmopolite nationals and economic elites47 who promote Occidentalism as
a means of allegedly leading their peoples to a brighter future. The last point about
"unwitting reproduction," however, is tenuous considering the phenomenological
genealogy of the modern subject we have drawn out and the epistemic traces (coloniality)
that the geopolitics of knowledge veils over human subjects. The national and economic
46 Coronil, "Beyond Occidentalism," p. 57
47 For a classic, critical perspective on the role of economic elites and the formation of "national"
policies, see: Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Vol. I - Capitalist Agriculture
and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, (New York: Academic
Press, 1974); see also: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities.
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elites that subscribe to Western designs of power are already influenced by the
assumptions of rationality, freedom and progress inherent to Occidentalist thought.48
The Political Economy of Cold War Reason
We then find that at the end of World War II, modernization theory emerged in
Latin America from the ruins of European collapse in order to bring the underdeveloped
world into a new international economic order.49 Deployed under the banner of a more
sober U.S. internationalism, modernization was a strategy that usurped the place and
possibilities of local (geo-historical) forms of understanding and living, in order to
allegedly "establish the means of spatially integrating the traditional zones of the
developing countries into the national and international circuits of the modernizing
world."50 Just as Halford Mackinder had sought to make the British people "think
imperially,"5' so the elites in U.S. and Latin American governments sought to make the
"rising peoples"52 of the developing world "think globally." Yet in the immediate
aftermath of the war, it had been the Latin American Left that was empowered by the
48 See: Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, pp. 51-60
49 For a sympathetic account of this claim, see: Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe
Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); for a critical account, see: Frederick B.
Pike, FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1995)
s Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-colonial, p. 63
51 See: Chapter Two, p. 63, n. 48
52 In a speech before Congress on May 2 5th, 1961, John F. Kennedy maintained that the "land of
the rising peoples," namely the developing world, was the site of "The great battleground for the
defense and expansion of freedom today." See: John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the
Congress on Urgent National Needs," delivered before a joint session of Congress on May 25,
1961. Website:
http://www.ifklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003PO
F03NationalNeeds05251961.htm
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promises of modernization, bringing about a greater degree of liberalization in Latin
American societies, in particular Guatemala (1944-54), the Dominican Republic (1963-
65), and Brazil (1956-64).5 As historian Greg Grandin notes, however, "after World War
II, those opposed to a more equitable distribution of political and economic power had
more access to US military aid and beefed up their ability to repress domestic dissent.
The already cramped space for political negotiation became even more restricted."5 4
The increased polarization of Latin American societies brought about a change of
priorities for both the U.S. and Latin American governments, highlighting what Slater
calls the "shadow" of modernization, "the danger that through the process of social
mobilization, and as an inevitable component of the revolution of 'rising expectations,'
new strata or groupings would emerge that would be hostile to the Western-led process of
modern transformation."55 The triumph of the Cuban Revolution (1959) was precisely a
kind of hostility without precedent in Latin America, an effort at "counter-
modernization" that gave new meaning to revolution and seemingly dispelled the notion
of its futility against standing armies. 56 Attempting to break the encirclement of U.S.
geopolitical power, Cuba's foreign policy of counter-modernization placed it at the head
of an international struggle for economic and social reform, as well as made it a staunch
5 See: Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, pp. 47-71.
s' Interview with Greg Grandin, "The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War,"
by University of Chicago Press, Website:
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/30572 4in.html
* Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, p. 77.
56 Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Praeger,
1991), p. xi
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beacon for Latin American and developing countries' concerns worldwide.57 As the veil
of stability in the region began to unravel in the face of its own contradictions, and
foreign (U.S.) capital influence58 became more insidious, the Cuban Revolution
developed into a highly symbolic bulwark to U.S. threats and interventions. Cuba's
example became, "the driving force of political destabilization throughout Latin
America," 59 turning somewhat optimistic relations between the elites of Latin American
governments and Cuba into a defacto state of war.60 With these developments, new cards
had been drawn for Latin America's geopolitical arena, and the socio-political ferment
that the region experienced within the first few years of the Cuban Revolution (through
guerrilla groups and new patterns of political dissent) spread on an immense scale as "the
very economic and social foundations of Latin America were at issue." 61
Following the Cuban Revolution we find that "most of the civilian governments
[in Latin America] were endangered by the surge in demands for reform, the political
awakening of previously inert groups and the attempts to overthrow them by the Cuban
5 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy and the International System," in Joseph S.
Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (eds.), Latin America in the New International System (Boulder:
Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001), p. 184.
58 Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, p. 128; see also: Furtado, "U.S. Hegemony and the
Future of Latin America," p. 72.
59 Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution, p. 42.
60 The 2nd Declaration of Havana in 1962 acted as the Cuban government's formal declaration of
"irregular warfare" towards the conservative civilian and military governments across the region,
warning that "popular vindication" was coming across the continent. See: Fidel Castro, "Second
Declaration of Havana," delivered before a joint session of the Cuban National Assembly on
February 4d, 1962. Website in Spanish at:
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1962/esp/f104 0 2 6 2 e.html
61 Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution, p. 47.
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guerilla method."62 The popular stimulus brought on by the Cuban Revolution prompted
several crises in the region and breached a long-held token of U.S. spatial hegemony.
Cuba had not only humiliated the U.S. but, in spite of its subsequent political isolation,
had prompted a massive campaign of social and intellectual subversion, fueled by a
popular stimulus and a hemisphere-wide re-conceptualization of Latin America's history
of international relations. As Thomas C. Wright pointedly suggests:
"While the disruption of contact between Cuba and the rest of Latin America
succeeded in impeding [Cuba's] intervention in those countries, it did little to
reduce the most important influence that the Cuban revolution exercised in the
hemisphere: the power of its example." 63
The violence encouraged by Havana to radicalize Latin America's political order,
however, was soon countered by national security military regimes "accustomed to
intervening when crises created disorder and weakened the civilians' ability to govern." 64
The various military governments saw internal social strife as a microcosm of the
geopolitical conflict between the superpowers and a continuation of the fight between
Western and Eastern civilization. As Chalmers Johnson notes, "Recognizing that there
was no way it could rely on democratic forces in Latin America...the United States
therefore turned to the armies of Latin America for its allies and preferred political
leaders."65 Claiming to preserve and protect Western ideals from Marxism, the military
espoused the mantra of universal reason and freedom against a doctrine they believed
62 Fagen, "Repression and State Security," p. 44.
63 Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution, p. 65.
64 Patricia Weiss Fagen, "Repression and State Security," p. 42.
65 Chalmers Johnson, "The Three Cold Wars, " in Ellen Schrecker (ed.), Cold War Triumphalism:
The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism (New York: The New Press, 2004) p. 257.
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was, "intrinsically depraved...that everything that stems from it, however healthy its
appearance, has been eaten away by the poison that corrodes its roots." 66 In an
environment of increasing social tension and political re-organization, dissent was not
only perceived as a challenge to the internal logic of modernization and U.S. "good will,"
but became increasingly represented as part of "a permanent aggression which today is at
the service of the Soviet imperialism." 67 "The body of the country," one Argentine
general held, "is contaminated by an illness that corrodes its entrails," 68 thus playing on
the trope that the health and stability of the state meant the health and stability of society,
targeting "disease" through the invasive surgery of persecution and repression. 69
In spite of the later successes of civilian-led Leftist movements, like Chile's
Salvador Allende (1970-73), the rise of conservative insecurities and the geopolitical
alignment with the U.S. quickly stamped out the possibility, as John Lamperti observes,
of achieving "revolutionary social change...through peaceful, democratic means." 70 The
involvement of the U.S. in the Nicaraguan civil war (1981-89), along with its
66 Fagen, "Repression and State Security," p. 45
67 Ibid., p. 45.
68 Ibid., p. 44.
69 Argentina's military junta, in particular, perpetrated an immense amount of human rights
violations that had no parallel in the Southern Cone region. For a detailed account of these
violation and their evolution across the 1970's and 1980's see: Donald C. Hodges, Argentina's
Dirty War, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991) and Mauro J. Caraccioli, "Change and
Continuity in U.S. Human Rights Policy Towards South America," Paper delivered at the War
Crimes and International Responsibility: Human Rights, Law and Governance conference at
Florida International University, Miami, FL on February 2 4 th, 2006.
70 John Lamperti, What Are We Afraid Of?: An Assessment of the "Communist Threat" in Central
America, (Boston: South End Press, 1988), p. 20. For a study on U.S. subversion in Chile, see:
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New
York: New Press, 2003).
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questionable stance on human rights violations in the Southern Cone, only confirmed the
intensified character of its geopolitical objectives. 71 The conflict was quickly taken by the
Reagan administration (as well as influential academics) to represent the latest front in
the geopolitical struggle against the Soviet Union and another example of Latin
America's ideological naivete.2 We thus find, at the end of the Cold War, that by
privileging the violent imposition of a universal brand of modernization over the
democratic and geo-historical creation of indigenous forms of change, U.S. geopolitical
tactics shifted the optimism of post-War reconstruction (itself a form of spatial
sovereignty) to increasing social and political polarization, instability, and violence. In
the words of historian Greg Grandin:
"Cold War terror - either executed, patronized, or excused by the United States -
fortified illiberal forces, militarized societies, and broke the link between
freedom and equality, thus greatly weakening the likelihood of such a fulfillment
and making possible the reversal of the gains that had been achieved." 73
Modernization strategies had shifted from encouraging and developing the allegedly
positive ideals of Western social values, to purportedly curing the terror of subversion
through a geopolitics of social and military intervention. 74 These strategies espoused a
dogma that proclaimed the equality of actors in a system that has been historically
71 For a detailed study on the change and continuity of U.S. human rights policy towards Latin
America during the Cold War, see: Susan Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and
Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
72 Lamperti, What Are We Afraid Of?, p. 39; see also: Jorge G. Castafteda, Utopia Unarmed, pp.
51-89
73 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, p. xiv
74 See: W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1960); see also: Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial,
p. 64
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defined by material and structural inequalities, further reproducing and intensifying these
through discourses of political salvation.75 It seems that one of modernization's greater
paradoxes was to give developing countries the rationale to strive for self-determination
and thus "endanger the stability of societies undergoing process of social, economic and
political transformation." 76 As Slater notes, "Movements for radical change
were...frequently interpreted as the effect of outside penetration rather than the authentic
expressions of independent internal social forces," 77 justifying a geopolitics of
intervention in the name of a systemic correction, laying the groundwork for a tenacity (if
not pathology) of ideological domination and intellectual exclusion.
The epistemic boundaries created by this tenacity of intellectual and territorial
exclusion, as deployed through an Occidentalist culture of competition, are the key
elements that comprise what I call Cold War Reason As an extension of the drive for
spatial sovereignty, Cold War Reason is the practice of a logic of composition that is
informed by the modern understanding of place, the role of the state, and their
deployment in practices of economic modernization and academic (and thus political)
exclusion. Its distinctive feature lies in the pathological dimension of salvation that is
added to the traditional logic of modern subjectivity, attributing a messianic veil to what
is allegedly a universal and objective world of rational, competitive actors. Cold War
75 Particularly relevant here are Rostow's remarks in the mid-1970s concerning the exigency of
international partnerships of research, development and "new patterns of investment," as part of a
"minimum condition for the survival of modern industrial civilization." See: W.W. Rostow, "The
Developing World in the Fifth Kondratieff Upswing," in Annals of the American Academy of
Social and Political Science (Vol. 420, July 1975), pp. 111-124.
76 Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-colonial, p. 79.
77 Ibid., p. 83.
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Reason creates the geopolitical conditions that are favorable to its predictions by positing
difference as a source of existential threat and ideational instability. In a methodological
sense, the (super)naturalizing strategies of Occidentalism work here in the form of an
active "silencing of the past" that transforms the violent histories and geographies of the
developing world into magical moments that allow for the apparent appropriation of the
Western ethos.78 By tying Cold War Reason back to the project of modernization through
its emphasis on capitalist development and social stability, Occidentalism turns the
neocolonial and modern histories of Latin America into instances of the West's historical
movement of progress, ignoring the fundamental role these episodes have played in
making that development possible. 79
As an example of the geopolitics of knowledge, the critique of Cold War Reason
ties back to our phenomenological critique by revealing how the capitalist system of
production relies on modern subjectivity's tenacity of territorial and intellectual
exclusion. By manipulating both bodies and ideas, Cold War Reason informs the
behavior of states in the international system and the ways that behavior is
conceptualized by intellectuals. As an instance of the modern drive for spatial
sovereignty, Cold War Reason denies a space for the voices it has historically excluded
and limits the intersubjective nature of international relations, effacing a set of
differences that are much broader than those we find in the twentieth century. As Doty
suggests, "one structure of exclusion creates niches for others,"8 0 and we find that the
78 Coronil, The Magical State, p. 6.
79 See: Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, pp. 51-94; see also: Frederick B. Pike, FDR 's Good
Neighbor Policy, pp. 165-66; 211-214.
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silencing effects of modernization and Cold War Reason reveal three major conclusions
for the critical study of geopolitics: first, by making Cold War Latin America an example
of the destabilizing and destructive effects of imperial logic, we see that geopolitical
actions in the face of perceived international crises are based more on wars of abstract
concepts (ideological) that prompt division and dehumanization, instead of inclusive
collaboration and coexistence; second, as an instance of intellectual domination, the Cold
War stands as one of Latin America's most significant periods of political and
philosophical exile that remains thoroughly understudied, intellectually reproducing a
territorial tenacity of exclusion81 ; third, as the above historical vignette has shown, the
method needed in the social sciences in order to overcome intellectual marginalization
requires the displacement of a much longer history of ideologies, making our
phenomenological method part of broader effort in displacing the geopolitical nature of
all knowledge.
Phenomenology and the Geopolitics of Liberation
To speak of a geopolitics of knowledge is to speak of how knowledge is
geopolitically determined and used for the sake of political goals. A study of this kind,
having sought to explain how geopolitics is rooted in the embodied experience of space
and place, also seeks to elaborate how forms of knowledge are used to perpetuate myths
and representations of how knowledge comes about and how it should (and should not)
80 Lynn-Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 155; for a detailed account the effects of practices of
exclusion see also: Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age
of Reason, (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 3-38.
81 For a recently published study on this phenomenon, see: Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger,
"Political Exile in Latin America," in Latin American Perspectives (Issue 155, Vol. 34, No. 4,
July 2007), pp. 7-30.
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be used for socio-political programs and academic study. In its broadest and clearest
manifestation, the geopolitics of knowledge needs to be analyzed not only as a
geographical manipulation, but also as a phenomenon of intellectual and ideological
exclusion. Such a critical analysis thus requires that we understand the geopolitical as a
condition that seeks (through the writing of space) to write the nature of the human self
and of collective identities. In this process, geopolitics also seeks to write the ways we
understand human history, making the geopolitics of knowledge not only a phenomenon
of modernity, but also a phenomenon of coloniality.82 Rather than understanding
coloniality as a result of modernity's expansion into worlds "outside" of the Euro-
American experience, we should understand it as the constitutive element of modernity
and its established ways of thought and life.83
The relationship between colonialism and modernity is highly complex and one
that needs to be re-thought in order to understand the way coloniality constitutes
modernity. As Walter Mignolo tells us, the traditional understanding of colonialism
functions as "a concept that inscribes coloniality as a derivative of modernity." 84
Coloniality, however, is part of the very makeup of the modern because it works from the
position of establishing the structures and institutions that implement the ideas and forms
82 Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano refers to coloniality as the condition where patterns of
world power and order are based on ideas of ethnic distribution, making constructed geo-cultural
identities the central tenets on which resources, capital and social relations are controlled. See:
Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America".
83 See: Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox, (New York: Grove Press,
2004), pp. 48-55; Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp.
85-92; J.A. Mbemb6, On The Postcolony, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp.
237-41; and Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965)
84 Walter D. Mignolo,"The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference," in The South
Atlantic Quarterly, (Vol. 101, Issue 1, Winter 2002), p. 82.
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of thought that modernity champions (the Eurocentric principles of the Renaissance and
the Enlightenment). In a post-colonial sense, the places from which Western thought has
found its highest pulpits (the North-Atlantic centers of knowledge) have revealed
themselves to be historically and pervasively totalizing and imperialistic, especially at the
epistemological level. North-Atlantic circles of academic and intellectual prominence, for
example, have traditionally determined (by "consensus") the appropriate areas and
methods of study for philosophy, international relations, and the social sciences as a
whole, painting many of the approaches coming from the developing world as either a
mimesis of Euro-American efforts (and thus not worthy of exploration), or simply not
philosophy or science at all. In addressing the outside world, these circles speak down
rather than listen to the subjects of their analysis, further marginalizing their perspectives
as immature and thus, as Hegel famously asserted, remaining outside of World History. 85
An epistemic imperialism is thus legitimized through the claim to a personal
heritage of the Western project, a claim that predominantly makes Euro-American
perspectives the representatives of that project, along with a responsibility to guard it
from any kind of "alien" appropriation. 86 What such a conception of Western thought
ignores and eclipses is the fact that the so-called Western project is in fact a shared
inheritance of coexistence: the victims of its story form a fundamental part of its
development as its underside and condition of possibility. The existential state of these
victims is one of a lived-geopolitics: a position of being forced to receive and not to
85 See: Enrique Dussel, "Eurocentrism and Modernity," in boundary 2 (Vol. 20, Issue 3, 1993), p.
70, and Enrique Dussel, "Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism," in Nepantla: Views from the
South (Vol. 1, Issue 3, 2000), pp. 465-78; see also: G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History,
(Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1991), pp. 80-7.
86 Dussel, The Invention of the Americas, pp. 19-26.
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contribute to the debate about geopolitics, remaining subjects to the discourses and
designs of economic, political, and academic centers of knowledge and power. Though
instances of resistance by those who are oppressed by geopolitics have been classified by
critical scholars as that of "anti-geopolitics," 87 this is nevertheless a conception that arises
from the dominant (North-Atlantic) perception of events, a position that fails to illustrate
the lived testimonies and understanding of these very modes of resistance as part of a
state of coexistence. By connecting these geopolitical experiences to the broader web of
modern human life (particularly, the experience of space and place), I am attempting a
new form of dialogue and understanding about the geopolitical nature of knowledge that
seeks to engage both the critical and mainstream understanding of difference.
To paraphrase Mignolo, the Latin American colonial experience in particular is a
key local history of the colonial difference, 88 making the study of this experience and
history a fundamental part of studying the broader phenomenon of the geopolitics of
knowledge. By looking at the way modernization theory was deployed during the Cold
War, we not only described the way the expansion of a local experience and sense of
place (the Euro-American experience of development) attempts to "re-externalize" its
habitus as a mode of spatial sovereignty, but we also saw how this re-externalization is
reinforced by the pathologies of modern subjectivity and its strategies of political and
intellectual exclusion. Just as a place can express its desire for primordiality through the
geopolitical writing of boundaries and perspectives, a counter question should be given
87 See: The Geopolitics Reader, (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 231-84; see also Paul
Routledge, "Critical Geopolitics and Terrains of Resistance," in Political Geography, (Vol. 15,
No. 6/7, 1996) pp. 509-31.
88 Walter D. Mignolo, "The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference," p. 57.
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equal consideration: does not a place assert its own desire for being by becoming resistant
and critical?
The phenomenological critique of modernization focuses on the heterogeneous
make-up of societies in the developing world, maintaining that "modernization was not
just an externally diffused phenomenon, tied to Western capital and innovations; it had its
internal history and dynamic."8 9 Modernization theory stands as a key example in the
geopolitics of knowledge in two ways: first, modernization was equally espoused by both
North-Atlantic actors as well as Southern actors, from both Right and Left perspectives,
making its deployment (and imposition) a key example of how global power influences
and marginalizes knowledge by establishing hierarchies of existential values; second, as
mentioned above, modernization theory in the North and South shared a fundamental
concern with the role of the state (in this case, a hegemonic state) as a mediator of social
existence. As Slater notes, "Far from being an innocent or neutral or objective discourse
of a how a society might become modern, modernization theory was part of the
conceptual architecture of a diffusing imperial logic." 90 The nature of this architecture is
key to the analysis of the geopolitics of liberation.
The metaphor of a "conceptual architecture" presents two key problems for the
study of the geopolitics of knowledge: first, that of a division of labor, the loci of
enunciation from which knowledge of the international system is produced; and second,
the motives of actors behind the building of a conceptual project. Within the initial
division of labor, each worker holds a different status in a process of carpentry: one
89 Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial, p. 83.
90 Ibid., p. 85.
120
designs, one cuts, one hammers, one paints, etc. In the context of the international
system, the workers are not only states, but social groups and thinkers as well, that
equally provide resources as they provide philosophical and political critiques and
alternatives. The "successful" achievement of the project's stated goals (peace, stability,
development, etc., for all the actors involved) requires that a virtual logic of coexistence
be implemented in order to ensure the participation of each laborer, carrying no
necessarily preconceived notions of independence, hierarchy or primordiality that makes
one actor or mode of thought more important than any of the others. The first image, the
division of labor, lies strictly in a phenomenological context, that is to say, in the ready-
to-hand working environment where embodied consciousness meets others and all form
part of a mutual project. The second image, the motives behind participation, runs the
risk of being the more idealistic of the two problems due to its necessary involvement
with some kind of a social analysis and diagnosis.
As we discussed above, modern subjectivity already establishes a context for
states to engage in carpentry (their sovereignty, self-sufficiency, and universal freedom)
and thus mobilizes their efforts according to individual interests and objectives, along
with those of some of kind of solicitor (the source of capital, resources, and/or
compensation for the project, in many cases, national identity and security). According to
this logic of composition, all actors already possess a particular set of interests and goals
in mind (their own geo-historicity, if you will) that determines the choices they make and
the attitudes they take towards each other and the project. The solution to solving this
problem lies in displacing the desire to impose one set of objectives over those of any
other, recognizing each actor's intentions as part of a logic of coexistence that informs
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their identity and makes completing the project possible. The key to solving modernity's
discontents (if only in part) thus lies in recognizing colonialism's place in this history,
listening to the voices of difference that remain hidden in our structures and practices of
everyday life, a practice that will be the subject of the next and final chapter.
By establishing the grounds for a phenomenological critique of the geopolitics of
modernization, the present discussion turns to the possibility of a pedagogy of freedom in
the study and practice of international relations. Such a pedagogy, however, is not
possible through the epistemic lens that modern philosophy and traditional approaches to
the study of international relations provide us with. To advance a new form of learning
and thinking, a displacement of the structures of power that centers of knowledge
perpetuate is necessary and it begins with the acknowledgement of the colonial
difference. As described above, the colonial difference is, in Mignolo's words, "[an
epistemic] connector that...refers to the changing faces of colonial differences throughout
the history of the modern/colonial world-system and brings to the foreground the
planetary dimension of human history silenced by discourses centering on modernity,
postmodernity, and Western civilization." 9' As a radical reflection on the history and
nature of the relationship between the West and the developing world, Chapter Four has
sought to point out the mechanisms of exclusion and domination that modernization has
used to perpetuate a geo-economic and intellectual imperialism. To address how these
mechanisms occur (i.e., through literature, philosophy, culture, academic disciplines,
political ideologies, etc.), Mignolo suggests that an epistemic displacement of our
91 Mignolo, "The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference," pp. 61-2.
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analytical perspectives needs to be provoked,92 a "relocation of [our] thinking and a
critical awareness of the geopolitics of knowledge." 93
As suggested in the Introduction to the present study, an epistemic displacement
demands that we look beyond ourselves as part of our method, dislocating our thoughts
and work from what has been the privileged perch of Western philosophy to a position on
the underside of history and modernity. The act of looking beyond is not only the
recognition of difference in the history and development of thought, but the de-
colonization of this history and the liberation of the thought it has suppressed. Liberation
here not only entails direct political implications for the treatment of the countries on the
underside of the colonial difference, but it also entails the deepening and radicalization of
the methods intellectuals use to study these international realities by introducing the ideas
of lived-experience and of a living-history into the academic community's dialogues and
modes of thinking. Such an endeavor sees geopolitics as a fundamental example and
confirmation of these phenomena, thus making its experience a matter of existential
concern and a crucial and legitimate inquiry to question and study through the
phenomenological method. The implications of using phenomenology in the study and
practice of international relations will reveal that consciousness is not only a phenomenon
of place and history, but also one shared by all of humanity through the condition of
embodied consciousness. A pedagogy of freedom thus not only invites questions and
dialogue across academic and geographic boundaries, but also seeks to attain a more
inclusive inter-national perspective that breaks the tenacity of those boundaries.
92 Walter D. Mignolo, Capitalismo y geopolitica del conocimiento, p. 13.
93 Mignolo, "The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference," p. 67.
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Chapter V: Pedagogies of Freedom:
Lessons in the Practice of International Relations
"...while all development is modernization, not all modernization is development."'
- Paulo Freire
The analysis of lived-experience and local history is a key contribution to the
contemporary study of geopolitics, particularly in its grounding of critical analysis from
the heavens of Western political philosophy to the depths and labyrinths of situated
political practices. By mobilizing the idea of embodied consciousness (as rooted in the
social tenacity of place and local history), the study of international relations becomes
more than an academic discipline but rather a practice of everyday life. By internalizing
ideas, customs, and ways of thinking, this practice is most clearly visible in the
pedagogical reproduction of global designs of power found primarily in North-Atlantic
intellectual communities and universities.2 When modern thought is considered to rest on
the necessity to seek new grounds for understanding and expression, such a requirement
amounts to both a territorial and ideational expansion. The drive for sovereignty has thus
been the foundation of many historical designs (i.e., Christendom, Capitalism,
Communism, Western Civilization, Globalization, etc.) that have set up different
structures of power (governmental, economic, ideological) and which reproduce
themselves primarily through the representational apparatus of academia and a growing
culture of competition.
' Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, (Hagerstown: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 130.
2 Walter D. Mignolo, "The Role of the Humanities in the Corporate University," in PMLA, (Vol.
115, No. 5, Oct. 2000), pp. 1238-1245.
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